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Abstract
By the mid-19th century, America was the most educated nation on Earth: signi…cant
…nancial investments in education were being undertaken and the majority of children volun-
tarily attended public schools. So why did states across America start introducing compulsory
schooling laws at this time in history? We provide qualitative and quantitative evidence that
states adopted compulsory schooling laws as a nation-building tool to instill civic values to the
tens of millions of culturally diverse migrants who arrived during the ‘Age of Mass Migration’
between 1850 and 1914. We show the adoption of state level compulsory schooling laws oc-
curred signi…cantly earlier in states that hosted a subgroup of European migrants with lower
exposure to civic values in their home countries. We then use cross-county data to show the
same subgroup of European migrants had signi…cantly lower demand for American common
schooling pre-compulsion, and so would have been less exposed to the kinds of civic value
or discipline instilled by the American education system had compulsory schooling not been
passed. By studying the link between mass migration and the endogenous policy responses
of American-born voters in receiving states, our analysis provides new micro-foundations for
compulsory schooling laws, the legislative bedrock on which all future developments of the
American schooling system were built. JEL Codes: D02, F22, I28, O15, P16.
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1 Introduction
By the mid-19th century Americans were the most educated population in the world: …nancial in-
vestments into education were substantial and voluntary attendance was high [Landes and Solomon
1972, Black and Sokolo¤ 2006, Goldin and Katz 2008]. Figure 1 illustrates this point with newly
assembled panel data on enrolment rates for 5-14 year olds from 1830 through 1890 for the US and
similarly developed nations. The …gure shows that US enrolment rates were above 50%, trending
upwards, and diverging from other countries from 1850 onwards. At the same point in time, US
states began introducing compulsory schooling laws. This is puzzling because the laws could not
have been binding for the average American child, nor were they binding for the marginal child
and thus the driving force behind ‘the educated American’ [Goldin and Katz 2003, 2008].1 Nor
were they targeting blacks, as legislative caveats often e¤ectively excluded them from schools even
post-compulsion [Black and Sokolo¤ 2006, Collins and Margo 2006].
This paper tests the hypothesis that compulsory schooling laws were introduced to teach the
children of migrants who moved to America during the ‘Age of Mass Migration’ the same civic
values, or discipline, taught to American-born children, who were voluntarily attending American
common schools in large numbers. Two observations underpin our hypothesis. First, that civic
values are at the core of state building as they underpin democratic institutions [Glaeser et al.
2007] in part because they can discipline the young and so help deal with potential unrest or
instability, reduce the costs of social interaction, coordination or information exchange [Bowles
and Gintis 1976, Gradstein and Justmann 2002, Helliwell and Putnam 2007] and make individuals
more likely to take actions to improve the common welfare of their community [Alesina and Reich
2015]. Second, the idea that schools shape civic values is well established in the social sciences
[Almond and Verba 1963, Kamens 1988, Brady et al. 1995]. As detailed by Glaeser et al. [2007],
educationalists themselves often list socialization as a pillar of curriculum design [Dewey 1944,
Bourdieu and Paserron 1970, Bowles and Gintis 1976, Gordon and Browne 2004, Driscoll and
Nagel 2005]. Indeed, a body of evidence in economics now supports the idea that schools a¤ect
individual values via the content of curricula [Algan et al. 2013, Clots-Figueras and Masella
2013, Cantoni et al. 2015], and that those exposed to compulsory schooling are causally more
likely to be registered to vote, to vote, to engage in political discussion with others, to follow
political campaigns and attend political meetings, as well as having higher rates of participation
in community a¤airs and trust in government [Dee 2004, Milligan et al. 2004]. All these traits
1A body of work has emphasized Americans became educated because of …scal decentralization, public funding,
public provision, separation of church and state, and gender neutrality [Goldin and Katz 2008]. Goldin and Katz
[2003] document that compulsion accounts for at most 5% of the increase in high school enrolment over the period
1910-40, when such laws were being fully enforced.
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and behaviors might be viewed as those relating to disciplining individuals and weakening the
likelihood of social unrest.2
Our research design exploits variation in civic values among European migrants from di¤erent
countries as a proxy for the need to nation-build. Intuitively, the bene…t of introducing compulsory
schooling laws to teach civic values or discipline youth is higher where there is a larger population
that lacks such values. While we obviously cannot measure the civic values or discipline of the
migrants directly, we can exploit the fact that European schooling systems themselves developed
to instill civic values [Weber 1976, Holmes 1979, Ramirez and Boli 1987, Alesina and Reich 2015],
and thus migrants from European countries that had compulsory schooling laws were more likely
to have been taught civil values than those from countries without such law. We thus examine
how di¤erences in the composition of the European origins of the migrant population, holding
constant state characteristics that attract all migrants regardless of the compulsory schooling laws
in their country of origin, impact the timing of compulsory schooling laws across US states.3
Our analysis proceeds in three stages. The …rst stage presents qualitative evidence to underpin
the hypothesis that American society used compulsory schooling as the key policy tool to nation-
build in response to mass migration. We show this was driven by the view that exposure to
American public schools would instill the desired civic values among migrants, and a recognition
that such values could be transmitted from children to their parents.
The second part of the analysis uses a newly assembled data-set on the timing of compulsory
schooling laws across European countries and US Census data on state population’s by country
of origin. Given the multidisciplinary body of work documenting the nation-building motives
for the development of compulsory state education systems in Europe [Weber 1976, Holmes 1979,
Ramirez and Boli 1987, Aghion et al. 2012, Alesina and Reich 2015], we treat Europeans’ exposure
to such laws as the best available proxy of the civic values or discipline held by Europeans. Of
course, the exact way in which compulsory state schooling operated would likely di¤er between
each European country, and we lack direct evidence on the precise curricula of each country. What
we emphasize here is the notion that most state education systems generally instill more values
that underpin democratic institutions, such as discipline, say, relative to the counterfactual of a
non-state provided compulsory education system: in nineteenth century Europe this would have
amounted to either attending a private school, a religious school, or not attending school altogether.
2DiPasquale and Glaeser [1999], Glaeser et al. [2007] and Glaeser and Sacerdote [2008] document, using evidence
from the US and elsewhere, a robust correlation between education and civic and political participation.
3This logical chain requires two further conditions to hold. The …rst is that migrants transport their values
with them, a hypothesis that has much empirical support [Guinnane et al. 2006, Fernandez 2013, Fernandez and
Fogli 2009]. The second is that parents transmit civic values, and other preferences, to their children. Again, this
condition is also underpinned by a body of empirical work [Bisin and Verdier 2000, Dohmen et al. 2012].
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We then use survival analysis to estimate whether the cross-state timing of compulsory schooling
laws is associated with the composition of migrants in the state.
Our central …nding is that American-born median voters pass compulsory schooling laws sig-
ni…cantly earlier in time in US states with a larger share of migrants from European countries
without historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in their country of origin: a one standard
deviation in the share of these migrants doubles the hazard of compulsory schooling laws being
passed in a decade between census years. Naturally, migrants from di¤erent countries di¤er along
many dimensions other than civic values. These, however, do not drive our result which is ro-
bust to controlling for literacy rates among adult migrants, attendance rates of migrant children
to some form of school, religion, and English language pro…ciency. The central result also holds
across US regions, including in Southern and Western states.
The nation-building interpretation hinges on the comparison of the di¤erential impact Euro-
peans with and without historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in their home country
have on the timing of such legislation in US states. Unobserved state factors that make a location
equally attractive to both migrant groups do not bias this comparison. The chief econometric
concern is that the process driving the location choices of migrants di¤er between these groups of
European migrants. To address the endogenous location choices of migrants we present IV esti-
mates using a control function approach in the non-linear survival model, based on a Bartik-Card
instrumentation strategy: these further show our main result to be robust to accounting for the
endogenous location choices of migrants.
Finally, we set up a horse-race between the nation-building hypothesis and other mechanisms
driving compulsory schooling, such as redistributive motives, or due to a complementarity between
capital and skilled labor. We …nd some evidence for these alternatives, so there is no doubt that
economic factors also determined the expansion of compulsory schooling. However none of these
channels mutes the additional nation-building channel.
The third part of the analysis provides direct evidence on migrants’ demand for American
public schooling that underpins the nation-building e¤orts of American-borns. During the study
period, many migrant groups faced a choice between sending their children to parochial schools
(so based on religion), or to attend an American common school. Only if migrants’ demand for
American common schools was su¢ciently low would compulsory schooling bind and be required
to change migrants’ civic values or discipline. We develop and estimate a probabilistic voting
model over schooling provision that allows us to map from the equilibrium provision of common
schooling back to the relative demands for such American common schools among various migrant
groups, using cross-county data from 1890 on schooling provision and attendance.
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The revealed demands for American common schooling across migrant groups match up closely
with the cross-state analysis. We …nd that within European migrants, those from countries with-
out long exposure to compulsory state schooling in their country of origin have signi…cantly lower
demand for American common schools relative to European migrants from countries with com-
pulsory schooling. Furthermore, there is a signi…cant convergence in demand for common schools
between natives and both groups of European migrants when compulsory schooling laws are in-
troduced. Hence compulsory schooling did lead European migrants to be more exposed to the
civic values being taught to American-borns in common schools, and this was especially so for
Europeans from countries without historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in their country
of origin. This cross-county analysis links tightly with the state-level analysis by establishing the
counterfactual of what would have been migrants’ exposure to the kinds of civic values instilled
through American common schools absent compulsory schooling laws.
Our paper provides quantitative evidence on the hypothesis, put forward by historians, that
compulsory schooling was introduced in America to state build [Cubberley 1947, Meyer et al. 1979,
Engerman and Sokolo¤ 2005, Brockliss and Sheldon 2012]. It complements work on the economic
and cultural assimilation of migrants during the Age of Mass Migration [Abramitzky et al. 2014,
2016, Biavaschi et al. 2017]. During this historic period a wider set of educational policies
collectively known as the Americanization Movement, encompassing language requirements in
schools and ultimately citizenship classes targeted towards adult migrants and conducted by the US
Bureau of Naturalization [Cubberley 1947, Carter 2009], were introduced to assimilate migrants.
While other disciplines have recognized periods of American history where the schooling system
has been used to inculcate values among the foreign-born [Tyack 1976],4 our analysis contributes
to the literature by showing nation-building motives drove the passage of compulsory schooling
laws from the 1850s onwards, the …rst pillar of the Americanization Movement, and the legislative
bedrock on which later developments of the American education system have been built.
Most broadly, we contribute to the literature linking the national origins of migrants and in-
stitutional change. The seminal work of Acemoglu et al. [2001] illustrates how colonial settlers
from Europe established institutions that had long lasting impacts on economic development. Our
analysis can be seen as ‘Acemoglu et al. in reverse’ as we analyze how the American-born popu-
lation, from whom the median voter determines state-level policies such as compulsory schooling,
best responded in public policy to large migrant ‡ows from a set of culturally diverse countries.
4For example: (i) Native American children being sent to boarding schools in the early nineteenth century;
(ii) the dispatch of American teachers to Puerto Rico and the Philippines after the Spanish-American war; (iii)
attempts to democratize Germany and Japan after World War II. In more recent times, Arlington [1991] describes
how English became the required language of instruction in Southern US states in 1980s, in response to mass
migration from Latin American.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents qualitative evidence on the use of com-
pulsory schooling as a nation-building tool during the Age of Mass Migration. Section 3 develops
a conceptual framework describing how compulsory schooling can be used to nation-build by ho-
mogenizing civic values between its native and immigrant members. Section 4 describes the state
level data and newly assembled database of compulsory state education laws by European coun-
try. Section 5 presents evidence linking the composition of migrant groups and the cross-state
passage of compulsory schooling. Section 6 develops and tests a model of schooling provision to
estimate the relative demand for American common schools across migrant groups using county
data. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix provides proofs, data sources and robustness checks.
2 Qualitative Evidence
That American society used compulsory schooling as a tool to nation-build during the Age of Mass
Migration has been recognized in leading accounts of the development of the American schooling
system written by educationalists [Cubberley 1947], sociologists [Meyer et al. 1979] and economic
historians [Engerman and Sokolo¤ 2005, Brockliss and Sheldon 2012]. We highlight those pieces
of qualitative evidence that inform our research design.
We review how long-standing concerns over migrants’ assimilation informed political debate,
and how the education system was viewed as the key policy tool to address such concerns. This
was driven by the view that exposure to American common schools would instill the desired civic
values and discipline among migrants, and a recognition that such values could then be transmitted
from children to parents. We then provide evidence that nation-building motives informed the
architects of the common school movement, both as a general principle to instill civic values
among American-born children and to foster the discipline and assimilation of migrant children.
We conclude by providing evidence of curricula in common schools, as this relates directly to the
inculcation of civic values.
2.1 Migrants and Compulsory Schooling in the Political Debate
American society’s anxieties over immigrant assimilation have been well documented for each
wave of large-scale migration. These concerns became politically salient from the 1850s onwards,
most famously in 1855 when the Native American Party (also referred to as the ‘Know Nothing
Party’) elected six governors and a number of Congressional representatives. The party’s core
philosophy was one of ‘Americanism’, consistently communicating the fear of the ‘unAmericanness’
of immigrants [Higham 1988].
5
The concerns of American-borns over migrants’ assimilation are crystallized in the Dillingham
Report, widely regarded as the most comprehensive legislative study on immigration ever con-
ducted. The Report was drafted over 1907-11 by a Commission of senators, members of the House
of Representatives and Presidential appointees. The Commission was established in response to
concerns over the assimilation of migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, and produced a 41-
volume report, including a number of volumes solely dedicated to the role of the education system
in the assimilation process. The Commission repeatedly highlighted the importance of American-
izing immigrants. Moreover, the Commission explicitly recognized the role that children played
in the wider long run process of inculcating values in the entire migrant population:5“The most
potent in‡uence in promoting the assimilation of the family is the children, who, through contact
with American life in the schools, almost invariably act as the unconscious agents in the uplift of
their parents. Moreover, as the children grow older and become wage earners, they usually enter
some higher occupation than that of their fathers, and in such cases the Americanizing in‡uence
upon their parents continues until frequently the whole family is gradually led away from the old
surroundings and old standards into those more nearly American. This in‡uence of the children
is potent among immigrants in the great cities, as well as in the smaller industrial centers.” [p.42,
Volume 29].
2.2 Nation Building and the American Common School Movement
The key individuals driving the American common school movement were Horace Mann (1796-
1859), Henry Barnard (1811-1900) and Calvin Stowe (1806-1882). While each of them certainly
discussed the economic bene…ts of schooling, they were also united in a belief that schooling was
the instrument, “by which the particularities of localism and religious tradition and of national
origin would be integrated into a single sustaining identity” and could foster “goals of equity,
social harmony, and national unity” [p9, p39, Glenn 2002].
Horace Mann is widely regarded as the most prominent …gure of the common school movement,
becoming the …rst secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education in 1837 (the earliest adopter
of compulsory schooling). He believed common schools would, “promote moral education” and
“unite the country by teaching common values” [p147, p150, Jeynes 2007]. Like many advocates
for the common school movement, he recurrently emphasized the link between education and the
civic virtues necessary for e¤ective participation in a democracy.
Henry Barnard was the secretary of the Connecticut Board of Education, and was very much
5This view also matches with historic evidence on the inter-generational transmission of human capital, especially
language skills, from children to parents [Ferrie and Kuziemko 2015].
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in‡uenced by what he had seen of the European education system, in its drive to instill civic
values among European populations. His motives for building the public school system have been
described as follows: “Despite the challenges that Barnard faced, he, like Mann, was tenacious in
maintaining the view that the common school cause was for the good of the country. He believed
that democracy and education went together “in the cause of truth, justice, liberty, patriotism,
religion.”” [p154, Jeynes 2007].
Finally, Calvin Stowe was a key driver of the common school movement in the Midwest.
Stowe, like Mann, believed moral education was the most important aspect of schooling and was
also heavily in‡uenced by what he saw of European education practices, and compulsory schooling
being used to inculcate civic values.6
It has been argued that all these central …gures ultimately saw schools as the key tool for social
control and assimilation in America. Certainly, advocates of common schools came to emphasize
their role as an alternative to families to foster the assimilation of immigrant children. As Tyack
[p363, 1976] argues, “Advocates of compulsory schooling often argued that families–or at least some
families–like those of the poor or foreign-born–were failing to carry out their traditional functions
of moral and vocational training...reformers used the powers of the state to intervene in families
to create alternative institutions of socialization.”
One of the most noted advocates for common schools in Philadelphia was E.C.Wines. He
perhaps best articulated the link between compulsory schooling, immigration and nation-building:
“We refer to that over‡owing tide of immigration, which disgorges our shores its annual tens of
thousands of Europe’s most degraded population–men without knowledge, without virtue, without
patriotism, and with nothing to lose in any election..Are these persons …t depositaries of political
power? The only practicable antidote to this, the only e¤ectual safe-guard against the other, the
only sure palladium of our liberties, is so thorough an education of all our citizens, native and
foreign, as shall nullify the dangerous element in immigration.” [p742-3, Wines 1851].
6When Calvin Stowe reported back to American education leaders about European practices, he emphasized
that “public education in Europe was having a civilizing e¤ect on that continent because it was bringing Christianity
and the teachings of democracy to the most remote parts, where despotism often ruled” [Jeynes 2007]. Glenn [p100,
2002] writes, “The in‡uence of foreign models, especially that of Protestant states of the Continent, Prussia and the
Netherlands, was of critical importance in shaping the goals and the arguments of he education reformers. It was
through the nation-building role of popular schooling in those countries that key ideas of the Enlightenment and the
French Revolution of 1789 became central elements of what was virtually a consensus program along elites in the
United States throughout the century and a quarter beginning around 1830”, and, “that the alternative model o¤ered
by England, where education remained essentially in the hands of private, ecclesiastical, and charitable enterprise
until the 20th century, did not have more appeal suggests how strongly Enlightenment concerns for national unity
and uniformity dominated the thinking of the leaders in the common school movement.”
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2.3 Compulsory Schooling and Civic Values
American educators wanted their schooling system to place relatively more emphasis on the role
of schooling in shaping the character, values and loyalties or discipline of students as future
participants in political and social life. This philosophy is what would have driven the civic values
instilled into American-born children voluntarily attending schools in such high numbers (Figure
1) and would drive some of the legislative acts that introduced compulsory schooling, to also make
explicit references to civic values. For example, in Connecticut the law states the curriculum
must cover “US history and citizenship”, and in Colorado it states that instruction “must cover
the constitution”.7 In detailing how compulsory schooling laws were actually implemented, it is
important to note that American school districts have always had a high degree of autonomy. This
has led to considerable heterogeneity in practices, making it almost impossible to track curriculum
changes over time by district [Goldin 1999a]. Subject to this caveat, we highlight the following.
First, the alternative source of education to common schools were parochial and private schools.
According to Lindert [2004], 12% of all pupils were enrolled in such schools in 1880.8 Migrant
speci…c shares are not available but were presumably higher given that the language of instruction
in these schools was not necessarily English (and the …gure aligns closely with the overall share
of migrants in the population). In some cases, compulsory schooling laws required children to be
taught in some public school.9 In other cases, states regulated parochial and private schools by
specifying standards they had to comply with to meet compulsory state schooling requirements.
For instance, the standards set in Illinois and Wisconsin aroused …erce opposition because of their
provisions that private schools teach in the English language and that they be approved by boards
of public education [Tyack 1976].
Second, states di¤ered as to whether English should be the main language of instruction. Some
states imposed clear English language requirements early on, while in others bilingualism was …rst
accepted and then banned from public schools.10 Eventually the Americanization Movement led to
7Glaeser et al. [2007] note that even today, a ‘content standard’ listed by California’s Department of Education
advocates that students, “understand the obligations of civic-mindedness, including voting, being informed on civic
issue, volunteering and performing public service, and serving in the military or alternative service”.
8Pritchett and Viarengo [2015] develop a model of why governments typically produce schooling (rather than
the private sector). The key idea is the lack of veri…ability of socialization and instruction of beliefs, which makes
third party contracting for socialization problematic.
9For example, the Massachusetts law of 1952 states that, “Every person who shall have any child under his
control between the ages of eight and fourteen years, shall send such child to some public school within the town or
city in which he resides...”
10For example, a 1919 law in Minnesota reads: “A school, to satisfy the requirements of compulsory attendance,
must be one in which all the common branches are taught in the English language, from textbooks written in the
English language and taught by teachers quali…ed to teach in the English language. A foreign language may be
taught when such language is an elective or a prescribed subject of the curriculum, not to exceed one hour each
day.” [Minnesota, Laws 1919, Ch. 320, amending Gen. Stat. 1914, sec. 2979 as described in Ruppenthal 1920].
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further legislative iterations making language and instruction requirements more explicit [Lleras-
Muney and Shertzer 2015]. This was ultimately followed by the introduction of citizenship classes
targeted to foreign-born adults from 1915-16 onwards, that were in part conducted by the US
Bureau of Naturalization [Cubberley 1947]. These classes were designed to, “imbue the immigrant
with American ideals of living...and preparing them for citizenship” [Carter 2009, p23-4]. In short,
it is not that nation-building e¤orts ignored adult immigrants. Rather, as recognized by the
Dillingham Report, policies to target immigrant children were prioritized and attempted earlier.
3 Conceptual Framework
To bridge the qualitative and quantitative evidence, we present a framework to make precise the
idea of how a society made up of native and migrant groups, with heterogeneity in values across
groups, can use compulsory schooling to nation-build. The framework is closely based on Alesina
and Reich [2015]. Consider a state comprised of: (i) American-borns, normalized to mass 1; (ii)
newly arrived immigrants of mass  · 1. Individuals have heterogeneous civic values represented
by a point on the real line. Let () be the density of American-borns with values  2 R, and
() be the corresponding density among immigrants. Denote by  the ‘distance’ between values
 and ,  = j ¡ j, and let  denote private consumption. An American-born individual with
values  2 R is assumed to have utility:
 = ¡
Z
2R
() ¡
Z
2R
() (1)
The second term on the RHS of (1) measures the di¤erence between her values and those of
other American-borns; the third term measures the di¤erence between her values and those of
immigrants. American-borns thus prefer to live in a more homogeneous society in which individuals
share values. This is an intrinsic preference held by natives: homogenizing the population might
have other indirect bene…ts, but the underlying nation-building motive of natives is that they
prefer to live with others that share their values.
Daniels [pp.159-60, 1990] discusses the variation across states: “Beginning in 1839 a number of states, starting
with Pennsylvania and Ohio, passed laws enabling (or in some cases requiring) instruction in German in the public
schools when a number of parents, often but not always 50 percent, requested it, and these laws were copied, with
inevitable variations, in most states with large blocs of German settlers. The Ohio law authorized the setting up
of exclusively German-language schools. In Cincinnati this option was exercised so fully that there were, in e¤ect,
two systems, one English, one German, and, in the 1850s, the school board recognized the right of pupils to receive
instruction in either German or English. In Saint Louis, on the other hand, the use of bilingualism was a device to
attract German American children to the public schools. In 1860 it is estimated that four of …ve German American
children there went to non-public schools; two decades later the proportions had been reversed. In Saint Louis
all advanced subjects were taught in English. So successful was the integration that even before the anti-German
hysteria of World War I, German instruction as opposed to instruction in the German language was discontinued.”
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To see how schooling might a¤ect the homogeneity of values in society, assume …rst that a
voluntary schooling system is in place, attended by American-borns (as described in Figure 1).
We assume the school curriculum matches the values of the median American, . Attending school
shifts individual values towards  by degree . Schooling can impact a variety of speci…c values
[Lott 1999, Glaeser et al. 2007, Alesina and Reich 2015], and contemporary evidence suggests
the content of school curricula do indeed in‡uence beliefs and values held later in life [Dee 2004,
Milligan et al. 2004, Algan et al. 2013, Clots-Figueras and Masella 2013, Cantoni et al. 2015].
The population decides by majority rule whether to make this schooling system compulsory.
In line with our empirical setting,  is su¢ciently small so the median voter is an American-
born.11 As American-borns already attend school, the direct e¤ect of implementing compulsory
schooling is on the migrant population who are homogenized towards the values of the median
American, . Assuming a …xed cost of implementing (and enforcing) compulsory schooling, the
policy increases the tax burden for all by an amount  . Hence the utility of an American with
median values, , if compulsory schooling were to be introduced is,
 = ¡
Z
2R
() ¡
Z
2R
()(1¡ ) ¡  (2)
Proposition 1 Suppose all immigrants have values    to the left of the median American,
then a majority of Americans vote for compulsory schooling if and only if,Z
2R
() ¸  (3)
The Proof is in the Appendix.12
The framework makes precise that whether a state votes for compulsory schooling depends on:
(i) how di¤erent the migrant population is from the median American, ; (ii) the size of the
migrant group, (); (iii) the e¤ectiveness of schooling in shifting preferences, ; (iv) the …scal
cost of making schooling compulsory (and its enforcement),  .13
11Figure A1 uses IPUMS 1880 census data (a 100% sample) to show that while migrants account for a sizeable
share of each state’s population, they remain a minority in each state. This fact also holds on subsamples that
better re‡ect those eligible to vote, such as the share of men, those in the labor force, and those residing in urban
areas. Hence, even if migrants themselves demanded compulsory schooling, they were not pivotal at the state level
in determining the passage of such legislation.
12The assumption    simpli…es the algebra and best describes our setting. Allowing for overlapping prefer-
ences of Americans and migrants implies that if compulsion is introduced, this moves the values of some immigrant
further from the preferences of some Americans. The condition under which the majority of Americans then vote
for compulsory schooling depends on the entire distribution of preferences among them.
13The costs of compulsory schooling laws can also be interpreted more broadly. For example, with compulsion,
immigrant children would have had to reallocate time away from potentially more productive labor market work,
to be exposed to the civic values only the state schooling system could provide en masse. Second, and related to
the evidence in Section 6, there would be greater class sizes as a result for all children including American-borns.
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Section 4 details how we proxy the key measure, : pre-held civic values among migrants
using their historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in Europe. Section 5 takes this to
the data to explain the cross-state timing of compulsory schooling in US states. A necessary
condition for natives to prefer to make schooling compulsory is because it binds on immigrants
and so exposes them to American civic values. This is at the heart of the analysis in Section 6 that
estimates the relative demand for American common schooling among immigrants and natives.
4 Data and Method
The top half of Figure 2 shows the variation we need to explain: the timing of compulsory schooling
laws by US state, as coded in Landes and Solomon [1972]. This coding is our preferred source
because it covers all states from the 1850s. A prominent alternative coding is that provided by
Goldin and Katz [2003] (who extend the coding of Lleras-Muney [2002]). The Goldin and Katz
[2003] data only covers the period from 1900 onwards, and so does not provide information on the
33 states that introduced compulsory schooling before 1900. For the 15 states covered by both
the Landes and Solomon [1972] and Goldin and Katz [2003] codings, we …nd the year of passage
for compulsory schooling is identical for 13 states, and the di¤erences are minor in the other two
cases (Louisiana: 1912 vs. 1910; Tennessee: 1906 vs. 1905). We focus on determining what drove
the adoption of compulsory schooling across states. It is well understood that such laws were
initially imperfectly enforced, but became more e¤ective over time [Clay et al. 2012]. The existing
literature has focused on measuring the impacts of this legislation on various outcomes: a question
for which the enforcement of compulsory schooling is more …rst order.14
To operationalize the conceptual framework, we need to identify the key source of within-
migrant diversity in values to match  the di¤erence in civic values between Americans and
migrants. Obviously, no data set is ever likely to contain information on the actual values held
by American-borns and migrants, by country of origin. We therefore seek an empirical proxy
for the values held by migrants. Given the multi-disciplinary body of work documenting nation-
building motives for the development of compulsory state education systems in Europe [Weber
1976, Holmes 1979, Ramirez and Boli 1987, Aghion et al. 2012, Alesina and Reich 2015], we treat
14Clay et al. [2012] describe how there were gradual extensions in how compulsory schooling laws operated to
cover: (i) the period of compulsory schooling each year; (ii) precise age and poverty requirements for children to
attend; (iii) the application of schooling laws to private/parochial schools; (iv) increased requirements of cooperation
from schools in enforcement; (v) the appointment of attendance o¢cers, and then the institution of state supervision
of local enforcement; (vi) the connection of school-attendance enforcement with the child-labor legislation of States
through a system of working permits and state inspection of mills, stores, and factories. Table A1 shows further
details on the passage of key child related legislation by state. There is variation across states in the ages for which
compulsory school laws were binding: we do not exploit such variation for our analysis.
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Europeans’ exposure to a compulsory state education system in their country of origin as the best
available proxy of the civic values held by Europeans.
Our approach thus provides a natural distinction between two types of European migrant:
Europeans from countries that had compulsory state schooling laws in place before the …rst US
state (Massachusetts in 1852) and were thus more likely to be exposed to such civic values in
their country of origin, and European migrants from countries that introduced compulsory state
schooling after 1850 and were thus less likely to have been inculcated in civic values or discipline,
that might have been held and valued in American society at the time.
To reiterate, the exact way in which compulsory state schooling operated would likely di¤er
between each European country. We do not have data on the content of school curricula in Europe,
so are unable to exploit any such variation. We leave for future research any attempt to code
the speci…c civic values promoted under each schooling system, but what we want to emphasize
here is that, relative to a church- or family-based schooling, state education systems generally
instill values or discipline more in line with: (i) underpinning democratic institutions [Glaeser et
al. 2007] in part because they can discipline the young and so help deal with potential unrest
or instability, or because they reduce the costs of social interaction, coordination or information
exchange [Bowles and Gintis 1976, Gradstein and Justmann 2002, Helliwell and Putnam 2007]; (ii)
making individuals more likely to take actions to improve the common welfare of their community
[Alesina and Reich 2015]; (iii) shaping the acceptability of welfare transfers [Lott 1999].
For this purpose of this paper, we have constructed a novel data-set on the timing of com-
pulsory state schooling laws by European country, shown in the bottom half of Figure 2. The
Appendix details the data sources underlying this coding. Figure 2 shows the European countries
de…ned to have compulsory schooling in place by 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. The adoption of compulsory schooling in Europe is not
perfectly predicted by geography, language or religion. In particular, within each group of Eu-
ropean countries that adopted compulsory schooling pre and post 1850, there are countries in
Northern, Southern and Eastern Europe, and countries where the main religion is Catholicism
or Protestantism. This variation enables us to separately identify the impact on the cross-state
passage of compulsory schooling of within-migrant diversity in civic values from di¤erences along
other dimensions, such as European region of origin, language and religion.15
15This variation also ensures that individuals from both sets of countries arrive in each wave of mass migration to
the US (starting with the …rst waves of migration from Northern Europe, followed by later waves of migration from
Southern and Eastern Europe [Bandiera et al. 2013]. We also note that European countries without compulsory
schooling have higher GDP per capita than those with compulsion, consistent with nation-building rather than
economic development driving compulsion in Europe [Ramirez and Boli 1987]. The ratio of GDP per capita
between the two types of European country remains almost …xed over the entire period.
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Table A2A also provides the earliest and latest dates by which compulsory schooling might
reasonably be argued to have been passed in any country, given the sources cited and ambigui-
ties/regional variations within a country (Table A2B discusses the coding for countries in which
there is within-country variation in compulsory schooling). For our main analysis we focus on the
dates shown in Figure 2. We later provide robustness checks on our results using these lower and
upper bound dates of compulsory schooling.16
Finally, Table A3 probes the link between compulsory schooling laws and school enrolment
rates in Europe, exploiting …ve secondary data sources. These data also make clear that even in
European countries with compulsion, enrolment rates remained below 100% on average (as with
US states). Nevertheless, in each data set, we compare: (i) enrolment rates between countries
with and without compulsion in 1850, in years prior to and including 1850 (Columns 1 and 2); (ii)
for all countries, enrolment rates in a 30 year window pre- and post-adoption (Columns 3 and 4).
Despite these sources di¤ering in their coverage of countries, years, and enrolment measures, we
see a consistent pattern of results from both comparisons that show: (i) European countries with
compulsion in place in 1850 have higher enrolment rates than countries without compulsion; (ii)
the adoption of compulsory schooling laws is associated with higher enrolment rates.
These secondary data sources support the hypothesis that migrants from countries with com-
pulsory state-provided education are more likely to have been instilled with the kinds of civic values
related to democracy or social stability, than children from countries where education would have
been provided by non-state actors: private schools, religious schools or households themselves.
Whether these di¤erences in values then translate to di¤erences in values held by Europeans that
migrated to the US depends on the nature of migrant selection. The evidence on the selection of
migrants based on their human capital, during the Age of Mass Migration, has produced mixed
…ndings on how selection di¤ers across country or origin, and over time.
For example, Abramitzky et al. [2012] show that Norwegian immigrants entering the US
between 1865 and 1900 were negatively selected: poorer individuals were more likely to migrate
and younger brothers in rural areas were more likely to migrate due to primogeniture system in
rural areas. Abramitzky et al. [2014] study convergence in earnings gaps between migrants from
a wide range of countries over the Age of Mass Migration, and the nature of selection of European
return migrants. In relation to the di¤erential selection of migrants into the US, they report large
di¤erences earnings gaps between countries. For example, Norwegian migrants had among the
most negative earnings gap at the time of arrival (in line with Abramitzky et al. [2012]). Negative
16We de…ne countries using pre-1914 borders, that can be matched into US census place of birth codes. Except
for Canada and Japan, we were unable to …nd detailed sources for all non-European countries to accurately divide
them into those with and without historic experience of compulsion.
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earnings gaps are also found for migrants from Portugal, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden. Positive
earnings gaps at time of arrival are documented for British migrants, and those from France and
Russia. Earnings gaps di¤erences were close to zero for migrants from Italy and Germany. Wegge
[2002] presents estimates for Germany. Comparing migration rates across occupation groups for
over 10000 individuals who migrated mostly to the US between 1852 and 1857. She …nds that
members of the richest and poorest occupations were least likely to migrate, while workers in the
mid-skill range, such as machinists, metal workers and brewers, were most likely to do so, that is
in line with results reported above of Abramitzky et al. [2014].17
Our central idea is that European migrants are selected in terms of their civic values or dis-
cipline. As these are instilled by state education systems, if migrants are positively selected, the
American median voter should target compulsory schooling in US states towards Europeans from
countries without exposure to compulsory schooling at home, as we have emphasized through-
out. Of course, if European migrants are negatively selected in terms of their civic values, then
American voters should instead target compulsory schooling laws towards those with exposure to
compulsory schooling at home. Hence the nature of migrant selection remains an entirely empirical
question that we determine below.
4.1 Descriptives
We combine US Census data on state population by country of birth with our coding on the timing
of compulsory schooling law by European country to compute for each US state-year, the respective
population shares of migrants from European countries with and without compulsory schooling
before 1850. Data limitations prevent us from dividing non-European migrants between those
with and without compulsory schooling at home: they are grouped in one category throughout.
Figure A2 shows the share of the state population in each group (Europeans with and without
compulsory state schooling in their country of origin, and non-Europeans), averaged across census
years before the passage of compulsory schooling laws in each state. There is considerable variation
in the size of the groups across states: the share of Europeans with compulsory schooling ranges
17For the period prior to our study period, Abramitzky and Braggion [2006] study selection on human capital
among indentured servant migrants to the United States in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They …nd
evidence of such migrants to the United States being positively selected. In contemporary data, Dustmann and
Glitz [2011] compare the educational attainment of migrants for the 11 largest sending countries within OECD
countries to those from their home country. They generally …nd evidence of migrants being positively selected.
However, this is not the case when they consider lower income sending countries, such as Mexico or Turkey, whose
migrants tend to come more from the middle of the distribution of educational attainment. Indeed, this view of
the changing nature of migrant selection is well summarized in Abramitzky and Boustan [2016]. They review the
evidence on migrant selection in the US and conclude that while historically, migrant selection patterns were mixed,
with some migrants positively selected and others negatively selected from their home countries on the basis of
skill, migrants today are primarily positively selected, at least on observable characteristics.
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from 05% to 18%, the share of Europeans without compulsory schooling from 3% to 29%, the
share of non-Europeans from 03% to 32%. Most importantly, the correlation between the migrant
shares are positive but not high, allowing us to separately identify the public policy response of
American-born median voters to the presence of each group.
Table 1 compares the characteristics of the di¤erent migrant groups and Americans in state-
census years before compulsory schooling is introduced. The …rst row describes the relative pop-
ulation share of each group and again highlights the considerable variation in these shares across
US states in a given year, and the variation in shares within a state over time. The next two
rows in Panel A highlight di¤erences in human capital across groups. Among adults, the share of
illiterates is signi…cantly higher among Europeans from countries without compulsory schooling
than among European-born adults from countries with compulsory schooling.18 These di¤erences
are signi…cant even conditioning on state …xed e¤ects (Column 6). This is in line with the ‘…rst
stage’ evidence provided in Table A3 comparing enrolment rates in Europe among countries with
and without compulsory schooling. The next row in Table 1 shows these patterns persist across
generations. Comparing enrolment rates in any type of school in the US (public or parochial) for
children aged 8-14 in each group (the cohort for whom compulsory schooling was typically related
to), these are signi…cantly lower among migrants groups from European countries without com-
pulsory schooling than for children from European countries with compulsory schooling in place
by 1850. As expected, in terms of enrolment levels in the US, both migrant groups trail behind the
enrolment rates of American-borns, and enrolment rates of non-Europeans lie somewhere between
the levels of the two European groups.
This suggests compulsory schooling laws might have been passed by US states to raise the
skills of migrant children, rather than to instill civic values (that could only be acquired through
compulsion to attend a common school or requiring other schools to teach elements of the same
curriculum). We disentangle these explanations by exploiting variation in enrolment rates within
each European group, to see if enrolment rates per se drive the passage of compulsion, that would
follow from the skills-based rather than values-based nation-building explanation.
The remaining rows of Panel A highlight that the two groups of European migrants do not
signi…cantly di¤er from each other on other characteristics including the share of young people
in the group (aged 15 or less), labor force participation rates, the share of the group residing
on a farm, and an overall measure of the groups economic standing in the US as proxied by an
18Illiteracy rates among American-born adults are higher than for any of the migrant groups because migrants
are much younger on average. This fact combined with the strong upward time trend over the 19th century in
the educational attainment of Americans shown in Figure 1, means that their adult illiteracy rates of natives are
higher than for migrants because older cohorts of American-borns are included.
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occupational index score available across US census years.19
4.2 Empirical Method
We use survival analysis to estimate the cross-state timing of the passage of compulsory schooling.
We estimate the hazard rate, (), namely, the probability of compulsory schooling law being
passed in a time interval from census year  until census year  + 10, conditional on compulsory
schooling not having been passed in that state up until census year . This approach allows
for duration dependence in the passage of legislation by states (so that history matters), and
corrects for censoring bias without introducing selection bias. The unit of observation is the state-
census year where we use census years from 1850 to 1930. In the survival analysis set-up, ‘failure’
corresponds to the year of passage of compulsory schooling (an absorbing state). We …rst estimate
the following Cox proportional hazard model:
(jx) = 0() exp(
X



 +
X



 + ) (4)
where the baseline hazard 0() is unparameterized, and  corresponds to census year. This
model scales the baseline hazard by a function of state covariates. In particular, we consider how
the composition of various migrant groups  in the state correlate to the passage of compulsory
schooling. The division of population groups  we consider is between European migrants in the
state from countries with and without historic exposure to compulsory state-provided education
systems, as well as non-European migrants.   is the share of the state population that is in
group  in year : this is our key variable of interest;  includes the same group characteristics
shown in Table 1.  includes the total population of the state, and the state’s occupational
index score, a proxy for the state’s economic development.
The coe¢cient of interest is how changes in the composition of the state population group 
a¤ect the hazard of passing compulsory schooling laws, b. As population sizes across groups 
di¤er, we convert all population shares   into e¤ect sizes (calculated from pre-adoption state-
census years). b then corresponds to the impact of a one standard increase in the share of group
 in the state on the hazard of passing compulsory schooling law. We test the null that  is equal
to one, so that a hazard signi…cantly greater (less) that one corresponds to the law being passed
signi…cantly earlier (later) in time, all else equal.
The nation-building interpretation is based on a comparison of b between Europeans with and
19The score is based on the OCCSCORE constructed variable in IPUMS census samples. This assigns each
occupation in all years a value representing the median total income (in hundreds of $1950) of all persons with that
particular occupation in 1950.
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without historic exposure to compulsory state-provided education systems. The maintained hy-
pothesis is that this only picks up di¤erential selection of migrants based on their civic values. We
address two broad classes of econometric concern that the measure picks up alternative selection
of migrants. In the …rst, we use multiple strategies to address the issue that the process driving
the endogenous location choices of migrants di¤ers between groups (Section 5.4). In the second
we address the concern this measure relates to other migrant characteristics by testing whether
other forms of within-migrant diversity (such as language and religion) correlate to the passage of
compulsory school laws (Section 5.5).
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Findings
Table 2 presents our baseline results. The …rst speci…cation pools foreign-borns into one group:
we …nd that a one standard deviation increase in the share of the population that is foreign-
born signi…cantly increases the hazard rate of compulsory schooling being passed between two
Census dates by 24%. Column 2 splits the foreign-born into European and non-Europeans, and
the result suggests the presence of European migrants is signi…cantly associated with the passage
of compulsory schooling.
While similar results have been noted in the earlier literature studying the passage of com-
pulsory schooling laws, Column 3 splits European migrants along the key margin relevant for the
nation-building hypothesis. We …nd the presence of European migrants from countries that do
not have historic experience of compulsory state schooling at home signi…cantly brings forward in
time the passage of compulsory schooling in US states: a one standard deviation increase in the
population share of such Europeans is associated with a 64% higher hazard rate. In contrast, the
presence of Europeans with a long history of compulsory schooling at home does not in‡uence
when compulsory schooling is passed by states. The e¤ect sizes across these types of European
migrant are signi…cantly di¤erent to each other, as shown at the foot of the Table [p-value=.005].
Column 4 estimates (4) in full, so  further includes the enrolment rates of 8-14 year olds for
American and the three migrant groups  (the age group for whom compulsory schooling in US
states was most relevant for), and we present the impacts of these human capital related controls
(in e¤ect sizes) in addition to the coe¢cients of interest, b. Two key results emerge. First, the
distinction between the types of European migrant is robust to controlling for other dimensions
along which they di¤er [p-value=.004]. The magnitude of the e¤ect remains large: a one standard
deviation increase in the population share of Europeans without compulsory state schooling at
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home doubles the hazard of a US state passing compulsory schooling. Second, enrollment rates
of migrants’ children in the US have weak impacts on whether American-born voters introduce
compulsory schooling. We note that higher enrollment rates among the children of natives speed
up the adoption of the laws, as shown …rst by Landes and Solomon [1972]. This might re‡ect
the natural complementarity between American enrolment rates, namely, the extent to which
American children are instilled in certain civic values in school will inevitably increase the returns
to also instill the same values in migrant children using the same common schools.
To further document the link between compulsory schooling and the human capital of adult
migrants, Table A4 reports the full set of human capital related coe¢cients from the full speci…ca-
tion in Column 4 of Table 2, where all covariates are measured in e¤ect sizes. This highlights that
higher illiteracy rates among adults in each group are not associated with the earlier passage of
compulsory schooling. Indeed, states with less literate adult populations of American-borns and
Europeans with exposure to state compulsory state education systems in their country of origin,
adopt compulsory schooling signi…cantly later in time, all else equal. This runs counter to the
idea that the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling was driven predominantly by a desire
by American-borns to skill the migrant population.
The nation-building explanation thus remains …rst order: the conceptual framework highlighted
that American-borns have a desire to homogenize those migrants that are more distant from them
in values or discipline, and the empirical evidence suggests it is the civic values held by migrants,
as proxied by their historic exposure to compulsory state-provided education systems at home,
rather than migrants’ investment in the human capital of their children in the US, or the skills
among adults, that largely drives the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling.
Of course, the American median voter could have targeted those with compulsory schooling
in their country of origin because either: (i) state education systems inculcate country-speci…c
identities that are not transportable across locations, and so those individuals are most in need
of being re-indoctrinated with American values, or; (ii) migrants are negatively selected so that
those with civic values most similar to Americans are those that migrate from European countries
without compulsory schooling in 1850. This is strongly rejected by the data. Rather, we …nd
American-borns target those Europeans without historic experience of compulsory schooling in
their country of origin (as well as towards non-Europeans who are also unlikely to have compulsory
schooling back home). This is consistent with compulsory schooling being a nation-building tool
because of its impact on civic values that were common and transportable across Europe and
America in the nineteenth century.
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5.2 Robustness Checks
We assess the robustness of our core …nding along multiple dimensions, as described in more
detail in the Appendix. Speci…cation (4) proxies migrants’ civic values held by exploiting cross-
country di¤erences in whether migrants’ country of origin had compulsory state schooling laws
in place in 1850 or not. The …rst robustness check explores an alternative speci…cation that
exploits within-country variation over time in exposure to compulsory state schooling. We do
so by considering a rolling window of Europeans’ exposure to compulsory schooling to examine
whether the American median-voter is di¤erentially sensitive to the presence of European migrants
that have passed compulsory schooling at least 30 years ago, versus the presence of Europeans from
countries that have either never passed compulsory schooling or passed it less than a generation
ago. This highlights how American voters react di¤erently over time to migrants from the same
country, as that country becomes exposed to compulsory schooling at home. This helps further pin
down that when passing compulsory schooling laws, American-born median voters across states
are responding to the civic values held by European migrants, rather than some time invariant
characteristic of European countries that had compulsion in place in 1850.
The result, in Column 1 of Table A5, demonstrates that with this de…nition, the sharp contrast
between how American-borns react to di¤erent types of European migrant becomes even more
pronounced: a one standard deviation increase in the population share of European migrants from
countries that do not have more than a generation of exposure to compulsory schooling at home
signi…cantly increases the hazard by 231. In contrast, the presence of Europeans with compulsory
schooling at home for at least one generation signi…cantly reduces the hazard rate below one. These
results highlight how American-born voters appear to react di¤erentially over time to the same
country of origin as that country’s population accumulates experience of compulsory schooling,
with their civic values being shaped as a result.
Table A5 then shows the robustness of our main …nding to additionally controlling for three
classes of variable. First, we control for the passage of other legislation in US states, that might
be complementary to, or pre-requisites for, compulsory schooling law. For example, child labor
laws and the establishment of a birth registration system have been argued to be interlinked with
compulsory schooling [Lleras-Muney 2002, Goldin and Katz 2003]. Second, we show the main
result survives controlling for proxies for the states’ progressivity. Third, we control for additional
types of legislation passed in European countries: in particular we show our main result is robust
to controlling for the presence of European migrants from countries with and without child labor
laws in 1850, to rule out that such policy preferences drive migrants to sort into locations with
like-minded Americans, rather than compulsory schooling being introduced as a nation-building
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tool by American-borns.
Table A6 shows our main result continues to hold using: (i) alternative econometric speci…-
cations, including imposing parametric structure on the underlying hazard, 0(); (ii) alternative
classi…cations of European countries with and without compulsory schooling, using the lower and
upper bound limits of when compulsory schooling could have been introduced, shown in Table A2.
5.3 Spatial Variation
Figure 2 highlighted a clear spatial pattern across the US in the adoption of compulsory schooling,
with Southern and Western states trailing other regions. We next address whether there could be
a very di¤erent process driving compulsory schooling law in those regions.
Many Western states were admitted to the Union towards the end of the 19th Century, and
passed compulsory schooling laws just before gaining entrance. Such states might have introduced
compulsory schooling laws in order to enter the Union, rather than because of nation-building
motives. On the other hand, the requirements for entering the Union in the US Constitution
(Article IV, Section 3) make no explicit reference to any degree of modernization or institutional
complexity that candidate states must have reached, and some educationalists have been explicit
that the nation-building hypothesis is as relevant in Western states as others [Meyer et al. 1979].
In Southern states there was huge resistance to educating black children (before the Civil War
it was illegal in many Southern states to teach slaves to read or write) [Margo 1990]. At the
same time, caveats were often included in compulsory schooling laws to ensure blacks did not
bene…t from compulsion, such as exemptions due to poverty or distance from the nearest public
school [Lleras-Muney 2002, Black and Sokolo¤ 2006, Collins and Margo 2006]. A related concern
however arises because during our study period, the Great Migration of Blacks occurred from
Southern to urban Northern states (hence more closely matching the spatial patterns in Figure
2). However, this is unlikely to be related to the passage of compulsion because the migration of
blacks occurred mostly between 1916 and 1930, well after compulsory schooling laws began to be
introduced: pre-1910 the net migration of blacks was only .5mn [Collins 1997].20
Taking these concerns to data, Column 1 estimates the baseline speci…cation excluding Western
states: we continue to …nd the presence of European migrants from countries without a history
of compulsory schooling to be signi…cantly related to the cross-state timing of compulsion across
states, and there to be a di¤erential impact from Europeans with historic exposure to compulsory
schooling at home [p-value=000]. Estimating the baseline speci…cation excluding Southern states
20Chay and Munshi [2013] document that an important pull factor for black migration to start in 1916 was the
shutting down of European migration, that left labor supply shortages in Northern states. Prior to 1916 there is
little evidence that European and black migration to states was interlinked.
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leads to the removal of 17 states and the sample falls to 133. The result in Column 2 shows
that the pattern of point estimates on the b’s to be in line with the baseline results, although
the estimates are more imprecise in this smaller sample. Nevertheless, we continue to …nd a
signi…cantly di¤erential impact from Europeans with and without historic exposure to compulsory
schooling at home [p-value=024].
To maintain an adequate sample size, Column 3 estimates (4) using only Western and Southern
states: even in this subsample the nation-building explanation holds. Even if other factors drove
compulsion on those areas – such as the desire to enter the Union or the desire not to educate
blacks – it remains the case that in both sets of states, the cross-state timing of compulsion relates
to the composition of European migrants present in the same.
Finally, we limit attention to states that are observed in all census years from 1850 to 1930.
These comprise long established states in which the desire to nation-build might be stronger than
in states that joined the Union more recently. The result, in Column 4 suggests that in long
established states, American-born voters remain sensitive to the presence of European migrants
from countries without a history of compulsory state schooling.
5.4 Endogenous Location Choices of Migrants
As migrants sort into locations, a natural econometric concern is that this process might be driven
by unobserved factors that also drive the passage of compulsory schooling laws. Such endogenous
location choices can only drive the core result if European migrants without long exposure to
compulsory state schooling at home are attracted by unobservable state characteristics correlated
with the adoption of schooling laws, while European migrants with long exposure to compulsory
schooling at home are not attracted by these same characteristics.
We address the issue instrumenting for the share of the population of group  in state  in
census year  using a Bartik-Card strategy, where we use the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI)
method for instrumenting in a non-linear model: as detailed in the Appendix, this method assumes
unobservables () enter additively in the proportional hazard model and these correlate with the
endogenous covariates,  . The instrument has been much utilized in the immigration literature
and is based on the intuition that migrants tend to locate where there are already members of the
same group. To construct the instrument for   we …rst calculate the nationwide share of migrant
group  (so   summed across states  at time ) in states that have not adopted, weighted by
state ’s share of that migrant group  in the previous census period in states that have not
adopted compulsory schooling. We measure population shares in e¤ect sizes and so denote the
e¤ect size of migrant group  in state  in census year  by   . The instrument is then de…ned
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as follows:
  =
 ¡1P
2(¡1)

¡1
X
2()
   (5)
where () is the set of states that remain at risk of adopting compulsory schooling law in census
period ,  is the cardinality of () and  is the cardinality of (¡ 1). This instrument can be
calculated for all census years except the …rst.
Table A7 reports the …rst stage results: for each group , the instruments correlate with
migration shares   : all coe¢cients lie in the range 69¡ 90 and all are statistically signi…cant
at the 1% level. Column 1 in Table 4 shows the second stage results using the 2SRI method,
that controls directly for any endogenous component of migrant population shares not predicted
by the instrument, by including the …rst stage residuals. The point estimates for the b’s remain
stable, although each is slightly more imprecise. However, it remains the case that the presence
of European migrants from countries that do not have historic experience of compulsory state
schooling at home signi…cantly brings forward in time the passage of compulsory schooling: a one
standard deviation increase in the population share of such Europeans is associated with a 65%
higher hazard rate. In contrast, the presence of Europeans with a long history of compulsory
schooling at home does not in‡uence when compulsory schooling is passed by US states, although
the 2SRI estimates are imprecise so we cannot reject the null that these hazards are equal.
To improve precision, Column 2 presents 2SRI estimates assuming the underlying hazard fol-
lows a Log logistic distribution. In this speci…cation the coe¢cients of interest b are presented in
a time ratio format (rather than a hazard). A time ratio less than one has the same interpretation
as a hazard greater than one, indicating the covariate is associated with the passage of compulsory
schooling earlier in time. The second stage results closely align with the baseline …ndings: the
presence of European migrants from countries without historic experience of compulsory schooling
at home signi…cantly brings forward in time the passage of compulsory schooling. In contrast,
the presence of Europeans with a long history of compulsory schooling at home does not in‡u-
ence the timing of compulsory schooling law, and these e¤ect sizes across European migrants are
signi…cantly di¤erent to each other [p-value=.056].
There is no particular reason to think the …rst stage relationship between   and 

 is
linear. We therefore consider a non-parametric …rst stage for  , 

 = (

 

) + 

with
() unknown.21 Column 3 shows the result from this more ‡exible …rst stage: the passage of
compulsory schooling in a state occurs signi…cantly earlier in time in the presence of more European
21A consistent estimate of ^ is then obtained as the di¤erence between ^(

 

) and 

, using local linear
regression with Epanechnikov Kernel weights to …rst obtain ^().
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migrants from countries without historic experience of compulsory schooling, and the impacts of
the two groups of European migrant are signi…cantly di¤erent to each other [p-value=.013].
Finally, Column 4 presents 2SRI estimates from the full model that includes the exogenous
variables  = (

, ). In the …rst stage, Columns 4-6 in Table A7 show the instrument contin-
ues to be highly signi…cantly associated with all three migrant share groups. In the second stage,
Column 4 in Table 4 shows a pattern of impacts very similar to the baseline estimates from the
full model: the …ndings provide strong support for the nation-building hypothesis. The presence of
European migrants without historic exposure to compulsory schooling at home signi…cantly brings
forward in time the passage of compulsory schooling law; the presence of European migrants with
historic exposure to compulsory schooling has no impact on the timing of compulsory schooling
law, and these impacts signi…cantly di¤er from each other [p-value=.011].
The Appendix presents additional evidence on endogenous location choices related to: (i) the
internal migration of American-borns, to address the concern the passage of compulsory schooling
was used by states to attract Americans (or they took ideas over compulsory schooling with them
as they migrated across states); (ii) the internal migration of the foreign-born, to check if migrants
chose to endogenously locate into states after compulsory schooling laws were in place (we …nd no
evidence of trend breaks in migrant population shares in states pre- and post-compulsion).
5.5 Other Forms of Migrant Diversity
The nation-building explanation implies the key source of within-migrant diversity is in their civic
values, as proxied by migrants’ historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in their origin
country. However, American-born voters might actually be sensitive to other correlated sources
of within-migrant diversity. We next establish whether the form of diversity within European
migrants we have focused on so far proxies for another dimension of migrant heterogeneity.
The …rst dimension we consider is religion: during the study period the Catholic church re-
mained the most signi…cant rival to governments in the provision of education [Glenn 2002]. We
consider the US as a majority Protestant country, and use the Barro and McCleary [1985] data
to group European countries into whether their majority religion is Protestant or Catholic/Other.
Column 1 of Table 5 shows the result, where the following points are key: (i) among European mi-
grants from countries that do not have compulsory state education by 1850, the estimated hazards
are above one for both religions, although the hazard for migrants from Catholic/Other countries is
signi…cantly higher than for migrants from Protestant countries [p-value=013]; (ii) for Europeans
with a long history of compulsory state schooling the hazard rate remains below one again for both
groups of migrant by religion, and these hazards are not signi…cantly di¤erent from each other
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[p-value=289]; (iv) within European migrants from Protestant countries, there remain signi…cant
di¤erences in the hazard between those with and without long exposure to compulsory schooling
in their country of origin [p-value=052]; (v) within European migrants from Catholic/Other coun-
tries, exactly the same source of diversity remains signi…cant [p-value=000]. In short, while there
are important di¤erences in how American voters respond to the presence of European migrants of
di¤erent religions, being especially sensitive to Europeans from Catholic/Other countries, within
religion, historic exposure to compulsory state-provided schooling among European migrants in a
state remains a key predictor of the timing when such legislation is passed across states.
The Dillingham Report highlighted the divide between ‘old’ (from Northern Europe and Scan-
dinavia) and ‘new’ (from Southern and Eastern Europe) immigrants with respect to their skills,
economic conditions at arrival and migratory horizon. Hence the second source of within-migrant
diversity we consider is European region of origin. We subdivide European migrants with and
without historic exposure to compulsory schooling between these from old and new Europe, so
de…ned. Column 2 shows the result: (i) among European migrants from countries without com-
pulsory schooling by 1850, the hazards are above one for both subsets of Europeans; (ii) these
hazards are not signi…cantly di¤erent from each other [p-value=269]; (iii) for Europeans with a
long established history of compulsory schooling the hazard rates remain below one for both groups
of European by region of origin, and again these hazards are not signi…cantly di¤erent from each
other [p-value=348]; (iv) within European migrants from Northern Europe/Scandinavia, there
remain signi…cant di¤erences in the hazard between those with and without long exposure to com-
pulsory state schooling in their country of origin [p-value=066]; (v) within European migrants
from Southern/Eastern Europe, exactly the same source of diversity remains signi…cant in explain-
ing the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling [p-value=003]. In short, while American-born
voters are sensitive to the region of origin of European migrants, the over-riding source of within-
migrant diversity predicting the timing of compulsory schooling laws across states is di¤erences in
migrant values as proxied by their exposure to compulsory state education at home.22
22This result reinforces the earlier …nding that the human capital or enrolment rates of migrants were not an
important factor driving the cross-state adoption of compulsion, as migrants from Southern/Eastern Europe would
have had the lowest levels of human capital accumulation. The di¤erences in migrant characteristics between these
European regions of origin might capture a host of other factors including: (i) di¤erential propensities to out-migrate
[Abramitzky et al. 2012, Bandiera et al. 2013]; (ii) ties to second generation immigrants in the US (who are then
American-born but with foreign born parents). On the …rst point, we have also taken implied out-migration rates
of nationalities from Bandiera et al. [2013] and then created a four way classi…cation of European migrants by
their historic exposure to compulsory schooling, and whether they have above/below median out-migration rates.
The results con…rm that within-migrant diversity in values as captured by historic exposure to compulsion remains
the key source of variation across migrants. On the second point, in the Appendix we discuss the robustness of
our core result to splitting the American-born population between second generation immigrants and those whose
parents are both American-born.
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We next consider English language as the key source of within-migrant diversity that American-
borns might be responding to when passing compulsory schooling laws. All European migrants
from countries with compulsory schooling already in place by 1850 originate from non-English
speaking countries. Hence only a three-way division of European migrants is possible when con-
sidering English language as the additional source of within-migrant diversity over and above
di¤erences in values.
Column 3 shows the result, where the following points are of note: (i) among European migrants
from countries that do not have compulsory state schooling in place by 1850, the estimated hazards
are above one for both subsets of Europeans; (ii) these hazards are not signi…cantly di¤erent from
each other [p-value=555]; (iii) for Europeans with a long established history of compulsory state
schooling the hazard rate remains below one; (iv) within European migrants from non-English
speaking countries, there remain signi…cant di¤erences in the hazard rate for compulsory schooling
between those with and without long exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin
[p-value=057]. In short, American-born median voters appear more sensitive to diversity in values
among European migrants than diversity in their English speaking abilities. Indeed, the evidence
suggests a one standard deviation increase in the population share of English speaking migrants
(i.e. British and Irish migrants) signi…cantly increases the hazard of compulsory schooling by
66%, all else equal. As highlighted earlier, this result is most likely picking up the fact that Irish
migrants were Catholics, and this was an important divide in values with the median American.
The evidence above, on dimensions of within-migrant diversity such as European region of
origin and language, further reinforce the earlier …ndings that the passage of compulsory schooling
laws by American-borns was not simply driven by the desire to skill the migrant population.
Rather, all the …ndings point to the speci…c targeting of compulsory schooling laws in the US
towards European migrants that did not have a set of civic values inculcated to them through a
compulsory state education system in their country of origin.
5.6 Alternative Mechanisms
Nation-building motives are not the only reason why governments might provide education en
masse. Normative and positive arguments can be used to justify state provision of education
based on e¢ciency or redistributive concerns, human capital externalities, or complementarity
between capital and skilled labor during industrialization. While none of these necessarily require
compulsory schooling, we now assess whether our core …nding is robust to additionally accounting
for the basic predictions of some of these alternative mechanisms.
To examine if redistributive motives drive the passage of compulsory schooling, we estimate
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(4) and additionally control for the standard deviation in the state occupational income score
(the mean occupational income score is already in ). This proxies the redistributive pressures
the state faces. Column 1 of Table 6 shows that although there is a positive correlation between
inequality so measured and the hazard of passing legislation, the coe¢cient is not signi…cantly
di¤erent from one. The point estimates on the population shares of interest remain almost un-
changed from the baseline speci…cation, suggesting the presence of migrant groups and economic
inequality in a state are uncorrelated.
Column 2 examines the industrialization hypothesis by controlling for the share of workers in
the state’s labor force working in di¤erent occupations: professions, craft and operative. We …nd
that as a greater share of workers are engaged in the middle-skilled craft occupations, the hazard of
introducing compulsory schooling signi…cantly increases (the point estimate on the hazard is below
one for the least-skilled operative occupations). Hence there is evidence on compulsory schooling
being related to industrialization, but this additional mechanism operates over and above the
nation-building motives identi…ed in our core result.23
Galor et al. [2009] make precise how the industrialization process interacts with land inequality
in determining the level of state provision of education. They argue there exists a con‡ict between
the entrenched landed elite (who have little incentive to invest in mass schooling) and the emerging
capitalist elite, who do have such incentives given the complementarity between capital and skilled
labor. To proxy the relative balance of power in this con‡ict they propose a measure of land
inequality, that is the share of land held by the top 20% of all land holdings. In Column 3 of
Table 6 we additionally control for this same measure in (4). The result shows that the e¤ect goes
in the expected direction but the ratio is not signi…cantly below one. The coe¢cients relevant for
the nation-building hypothesis remain stable, further suggesting the composition of the migrant
population is not related to land inequality.24
The remaining Columns focus on the explanation that political parties were key to compulsory
schooling. Indeed, much has been written about the Republican-Democrat divide over compul-
sory schooling, with the policy often being seen to be driven by a faction of the Republican party
[Provasnik 2006]. In line with this we …nd that a one standard deviation increase in the vote
23This is in line with the evidence presented in Galor and Moav [2006] from England, on how members of
Parliament voted for the Balfour Act of 1902, the proposed education reform that created a public secondary
schooling system. They …nd Parliamentarians were more likely to vote for the legislation if they represented more
skill intensive constituencies (even accounting for their party a¢liation). For the US, Goldin and Katz [2001] argue
that over 1890-1999 the contribution of human capital accumulation to the US growth process nearly doubled, and
Goldin [1999b] describes how the changing industrial structure of the US economy drove changes in the content of
what was needing to be taught in secondary schools.
24This land inequality measure is available for 1880, 1900 and 1920: we linearly interpolate it for other state-census
years. Galor et al. [2009] show that state schooling expenditures are signi…cantly correlated to land inequality.
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share for Republicans in Congressional elections signi…cantly increases the hazard rate. Given
that signi…cant third parties existed for much of the 19th century, Column 5 repeats the analysis
controlling for Democrat party vote shares: as implied by the qualitative evidence, a greater vote
share for Democrats does indeed signi…cantly reduce the hazard of passing compulsory school-
ing law. However, controlling for Republican or Democrat vote shares do not alter the migrant
population share coe¢cients, that remain stable throughout.
6 Migrants’ Demand for American Common Schooling
The extent to which compulsory schooling exposes migrant children to the civic values that were
being taught to American-born children, depends on migrant’s underlying demand for American
common schooling. Only if their demand for common schooling was su¢ciently low would com-
pulsory schooling actually change the kinds of instruction they were exposed to. We now exploit
detailed information on locally-…nanced provision of American common schools in the cross-section
of counties in 1890 to pin down the relative demands for American common schools of the di¤erent
migrant groups.
6.1 Conceptual Framework
As migrants can form a signi…cant share of the population in jurisdictions that determine the
public provision of common schools, we use a textbook probabilistic voting model [Persson and
Tabellini 2000] to derive an empirical speci…cation that allows us to map from the equilibrium
provision of common schooling back to the relative demands for such schools among migrant
groups.25 A jurisdiction comprises a continuum of citizens. An individual  belongs to group ,
where groups are of size  ,
P
 
 =  . Within a group, individuals have the same income, .
Individual preferences are quasi-linear,
() =  + ()() (6)
where  is the private consumption of a member of group , () is concave in the public good,
 (common schools), and is assumed twice-di¤erentiable with (0) = 0. The group valuation
25This is in contrast to the earlier conceptual framework in Section 3, where we utilized a median voter model
to understand the passage of compulsory schooling law at the state level. The justi…cation is that: (i) at the state
level, migrants never form close to the majority of the electorate (as Figure A1 shows) and so the median voter is
American-born; (ii) the outcome studies was a discrete choice of whether to introduce compulsory schooling law
or not. In contrast, at the county level, migrant shares are larger, and we study a continuous outcome (common
school provision) so the probabilistic voting model is more appropriate.
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for American common schools is (  1()):  captures factors that in‡uence the group’s
demand for common schools (such as the share of young people in the group), and 1() is
an indicator for the historic entrenchment of compulsory schooling law (HCSL) in the country of
origin for those in migrant group . In line with our context, the local jurisdiction …nances common
schools by a local income tax rate  so individuals face a budget constraint,  = (1¡  ), and no
group can be excluded. The schooling supply side is thus not explicitly modelled: it is assumed
whatever is …nanced is supplied. It is because of this local …nancing that we can map between
observed equilibrium provision of common schools and the underlying demand for those schools.
The probabilistic voting model speci…es the following political process determining the equi-
librium provision of common schooling: there are two political parties (, ), whose only mo-
tivation is to hold o¢ce. The source of within group heterogeneity is a political bias parameter
 »  [¡ 1
2
 1
2
]: a positive value of  implies that voter  has a bias in favor of party  while
voters with  = 0 are politically neutral. Hence  measures the political homogeneity of a group
. Voter  in group  thus prefers candidate  if ()  () + .
The timing of events is as follows. First, parties  and  simultaneously and non-cooperatively
announce electoral platforms:  . At this stage, they know the distribution from which 
is drawn, but not realized values across voters. Second, elections are held where citizens vote
sincerely for a single party. Voters and parties look no further than the next election. Third, the
elected party implements her announced policy platform.
Proposition 2 The political equilibrium is ¤ =  =  where ¤ is implicitly de…ned as,
(
¤) =

P


¹
P

(1())
 (7)
  =   is group ’s ‘political weight’, and  =

 


is the share of young in the population.
The Proof is in the Appendix.
The group’s political weight captures how in‡uential the group is by virtue of its size and how
many swing voters are in group . A key feature of the probabilistic voting model is that all
groups have some weight in determining the equilibrium provision of common schools ¤. The key
comparative static we consider is how this provision changes in group-’s size:
(
¤)
 
=
1

(
¤)
 
=

¹
³P

(1())
´2
"X
 6=
 [ ¡  ]
#
(8)
Hence the larger is  relative to other group ’s, the more likely is it that 
¤

 0. The sign
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of 
¤

can then be informative of ( relative to ). We use this intuition to rank the
underlying relative demands for common schools, (), across the  groups. This dovetails with
the earlier analysis of what drove the cross-state timing of adoption of compulsory schooling: our
earlier results showed American-born voters were sensitive to the in-state presence of European
migrants from countries without historic exposure to compulsory state schooling. Hence they
behaved as if,
(1() = 1)  ( 1() = 0) (9)
so that absent compulsory schooling in the US, this speci…c group of European migrants would
have demanded less common schooling, and as a result, those migrant children would have been
less exposed to the kinds of instruction shaping the civic values of American-born children. We
now recover estimates of this relative ranking to understand whether these beliefs were justi…ed.
Unlike the earlier cross-state analysis, here it is important that groups have endogenously sorted
into counties and so we can recover the equilibrium provision of American common schools in each
jurisdiction, and then back out each group’s relative demand for such schools.
6.2 Empirical Method
We estimate the model using cross-county data from 1890 that were collected as part of the
population census, but were the result of a separate report in which the Census Bureau contacted
the superintendents of public education in each state. Superintendents were asked to report the
race and sex of teachers and enrolled pupils in each county. The data, documented in Haines
[2010], details investments into common schools in over 2400 counties in 45 states. We proxy
the equilibrium provision of common schooling, ¤, using the number of common school teachers
in the county. These are locally …nanced and likely comprise the most signi…cant investment
into public schooling. As IPUMS 1890 census data is unavailable, we build control variables
using 1880 values based on the 100% census sample.26 The groups considered replicate those
in the earlier analysis: the American-born, European migrants from countries with compulsory
schooling, European migrants from countries without compulsory schooling and non-European
migrants. We then estimate the following OLS speci…cation for county  in state ,
ln() =
X

  +
X



 +  +  +  (10)
26While Haines [2010] does provide county level data on populations, this does not allow us to construct the
migrant group-level characteristics  described for our main speci…cation.
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where   is the total population size of group  (again measured as an e¤ect size), and 


includes other characteristics of group  (the share aged 0-15, the labor force participation rate,
the share residing on a farm, and the average occupational income score).27
 includes the (log) total population of the county aged below 15, and the county’s occupa-
tional index score.  is a state …xed e¤ect so the coe¢cients of interest, , are identi…ed from
variation in the composition of migrant populations across counties in the same state. Figure A4
illustrates the cross-county variation in migrant group sizes for four states (one from each census
region). Panel B of Table 1 provides descriptive evidence on the shares of county populations
from each group  and documents the considerable within state variation in these shares. Robust
standard errors are reported, and we weight observations by 1880 county population so our coef-
…cients of interest map to the average demand of an individual from group . Mapping the model
to the empirical speci…cation makes clear the relative ranking of ()’s across groups (not their
levels) can be identi…ed from the ranking of b’s estimated from (10). As we do not control for the
total county population, this allows us to control for the population size and characteristics for
all four groups  and so measure demands relative to those of the American-born. Importantly,
the ranking of b’s is thus informative of the relative demand for American schooling among the
various migrant groups, holding constant the demand among American-borns.28
6.3 Results
Table 7 presents the results. Column 1 estimates (10) only controlling for the populations of
each group . At the foot of the table we report p-values on the equality of these coe¢cients
to establish the ranking of relative demands for common schooling. The results highlight again
that a key source of diversity within European migrants in their demand for American common
schools is whether they have historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in their country of
origin: (i) a one standard deviation increase in the county population of European migrants with
long exposure to compulsory state schooling in their country of origin signi…cantly increases the
provision of common school teachers by 58%; (ii) a one standard deviation increase in the county
population of European migrants without exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of
origin signi…cantly decreases the provision of common school teachers by 18%; (iii) these impacts
27The County Yearbook provides information on public education for black and white populations separately.
For our analysis, all schooling related variables (teachers and attending pupils) correspond to whites. However, in
some states there is expected to be some small bias here as teachers of all races were pooled together. Moreover,
there is an imperfect match between true school jurisdictions and counties, and this attenuates our coe¢cients of
interest,  .
28It is well recognized that compulsory schooling laws necessitated no supply side response, so that the supply
of teachers would not have been directly impacted [Margo and Finegan 1996].
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across European migrant groups signi…cantly di¤er from each other [p-value =000]; (iv) the pres-
ence of non-European migrants is associated with signi…cantly higher investments into common
school teachers. This ranking of b’s is robust to including state …xed e¤ects (Column 2), and
group and county controls (, ) (Column 3).
Mapping the marginal impacts from the speci…cation in Column 3 back to the model then
implies the following ranking of quasi-linear demand parameters from (6):
1()=1 = 
¡    1()=0 (11)
This links directly to the earlier analysis on how the composition of migrants drove the cross-state
timing of compulsory schooling: there we found the American-born median voter was especially
sensitive to the presence of migrants from European countries without historic exposure to com-
pulsory schooling. The implied ranking of b’s across European migrant groups closely matches
up across the two sets of analysis, despite them using entirely di¤erent data sources, economet-
ric methods and identi…cation strategies. Fundamentally, it suggests European migrants from
countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling would have invested less in American
common schools (1()=1  

1()=0). As such, the American-born median voter held
correct beliefs in bringing forward in time compulsory schooling laws in those states where such
migrants were more numerous.29
Given the provision of common schooling is measured in the cross-section of counties in 1890,
half of all states have passed compulsory schooling. We thus estimate a modi…ed version of (10)
that allows the demand for common schools to vary within a migrant group depending on whether
or not they reside in a state with compulsory schooling. This allows us to establish whether
compulsory schooling laws had the intended e¤ect of increasing migrants’ exposure to American
civic values in common schools. De…ning a dummy equal to one if state  has passed compulsory
schooling in 1890, we estimate the following speci…cation:
ln() =
X

0  +
X

1
£
 £ 
¤
+
X



 +  +  (12)
where b0 and (b0+b1) map to the relative demand for common schools pre and post-compulsory
schooling respectively, for the same migrant group . The corresponding estimates are shown in
Figure 3. We focus …rst on Panel A: the left hand side shows the b0’s for each group  (and
29One disconnect between the cross-state and cross-county evidence relates to non-Europeans. This might stem
from American-borns being less informed about the preferences and civic values of non-European migrants. This
is plausible given the long history of anti-Chinese discrimination in the US, culminating in the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882, that banned all immigration of Chinese laborers.
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their corresponding 95% con…dence interval): the y-axis shows the magnitude of each estimate,
but as only relative demands for common schools are identi…ed from (12), we centre the point
estimates on the value for American-borns. This shows that pre-compulsory schooling, a key
source of diversity in values for common schools was between European migrants with and without
historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in their country of origin. Indeed, pre-compulsory
schooling, European-born migrants from countries with compulsory schooling already in place by
1850 have signi…cantly higher demands for common schooling than other European migrants and
the American-born.
The right hand side of Panel A in Figure 3 shows the change in demand for common schooling
for each group : these b1 estimates show there is a signi…cant convergence in demands for
common schooling with compulsory schooling. The increase in demand for common schools is
signi…cantly greater among Europeans without historic exposure to compulsory schooling than
among Europeans with such exposure to compulsory state schooling. Hence the introduction of
compulsory schooling did lead European migrants to be signi…cantly more exposed to the American
common schooling system. Moreover, this was especially so for Europeans from countries without
historic exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin and hence most distant in
terms of their civic values from those being instilled into American-born children.
The data compiled by Superintendents also allows us to re-estimate (12) but considering pupil
attendance as a county level outcome, as an alternative proxy for the equilibrium provision of
common schools, ¤. We thus assess how pupil attendance various with migrant shares in the
county, and how this relationship alters under compulsory schooling. The evidence is in Panel
B of Figure 3. We see that: (i) pre-compulsory schooling, counties with more migrants from
European countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin,
had lower attendance in American common schools; (ii) compulsory schooling led to a signi…cant
degree of convergence in demands for American common schools between migrant groups and
American-borns; (iii) these impacts on demand were greater among European migrants without
historic exposure to compulsory schooling at home.
In line with this set of evidence, Lleras-Muney and Shertzer [2015] show how compulsory
schooling laws signi…cantly increased enrolment rates of migrant children by 5%, with smaller
impacts on American-born children. Ultimately, this will have impacted the instruction migrant
children were exposed to (relative to the counterfactual absent compulsory schooling) and so
shaped the civic values that were instilled into them. Our evidence links closely to the …ndings
of Milligan et al. [2004], who show using NES and CPS data, that those exposed to compulsory
schooling are later in life, signi…cantly more likely to be registered to vote, to vote, to engage in
32
political discussion with others, to follow political campaigns and attend political meetings, as well
as having higher rates of participation in community a¤airs and trust in government. These are
precisely the kinds of changes in civic value emphasized in Glaeser et al. [2007] as being inculcated
through compulsory schooling. Indeed, our …ndings and these related papers all suggest that the
original architects of the common school system such as Horace Mann, as discussed in Section 2,
all of whom linked education with inculcating the civic values necessary for e¤ective participation
in American democracy, ultimately achieved their aim.30
7 Discussion
Many great …gures in political and economic history, including Napoleon and Adam Smith, have
emphasized the central role of a state’s education system in nation-building. In this paper we have
examined the hypothesis that nation-building e¤orts, through compulsory schooling, were part of
the policy response of American voters to the large and diverse waves of migrant in‡ows during
the Age of Mass Migration. While other disciplines have recognized periods of American history
where the schooling system has been used to inculcate values among the foreign-born [Tyack 1976],
our analysis builds on this by showing nation-building motives drove the passage of compulsory
schooling laws from the 1850s onwards, the …rst pillar of the Americanization Movement, and the
legislative bedrock on which developments of the American education system have been built.
We base our contribution on a combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence. The body
of qualitative evidence assembled shows American legislators and educators viewed compulsory
schooling as the key policy tool to nation-build in response to mass migration. We show this was
driven by the view that exposure to American public schools would instill the desired civic values
among migrants, and a recognition that such values could be transmitted from children to their
parents. The quantitative evidence base we build utilizes di¤erent data sources, research designs
and conceptual frameworks. The central measurement challenge we face is that the actual civic
values held by migrants and American-borns are not observed. We tackle this by appealing to the
multi-disciplinary body of work arguing that European schooling systems developed in order to
instill desired civic values and discipline into their citizens [Weber 1976, Holmes 1979, Ramirez
and Boli 1987, Alesina and Reich 2015]. We thus use migrants’ historic exposure to a compulsory
state education system in their country of origin to proxy their civic values.
30Recent evidence also highlights cases in which assimilation policies lead to a backlash among migrants: Fouka
[2014] presents evidence showing that Germans that faced restrictions on the use of the German language in primary
schools (introduced over the period 1917-23) are less likely to volunteer during the Second World War, more likely
to marry within their ethnic group, and be more likely to give German sounding names to their children.
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Our central …nding is that American-born median voters pass compulsory schooling laws signif-
icantly earlier in time in US states with a larger share of migrants from European countries without
historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in their country of origin. These are the migrants
most in need of having their civic values shaped towards what was being taught to American-born
children in common schools at the time. We show our core result to be robust to confounding
factors: such as compulsory schooling laws being introduced to skill the migrant population, or
in response to other forms of migrant diversity (such as language or religion), the endogenous
location choices of migrants, and alternative mechanisms driving compulsion, such as redistribu-
tive motives, or due to a complementarity between capital and skilled labor. We complement this
evidence with cross-county data on the provision of common schools to infer the relative demand
for such American schooling among migrant groups. Consistent with the state level analysis, this
shows that within European migrants, those from countries without long exposure to compulsory
state schooling in their country of origin have signi…cantly lower demand for American common
schools relative to European migrants from countries with compulsory schooling. Furthermore,
there is a signi…cant convergence in demand for, and pupil attendance at, common schools between
natives and both groups of European migrants when compulsory schooling laws are introduced.
Hence compulsory schooling did lead European migrants to be more exposed to the civic values
being taught in American common schools, and this was especially so for Europeans from countries
without historic exposure to compulsory state schooling in their country of origin.
There is existing evidence for schools a¤ecting individual values via the content of curricula
[Algan et al. 2013, Clots-Figueras and Masella 2013, Cantoni et al. 2015], and that those exposed
to compulsory schooling are causally more likely to be politically and civically engaged [Dee 2004,
Milligan et al. 2004]. Our …ndings thus come full circle back to the qualitative evidence presented,
to suggest the original architects of the common school system, all of whom linked education
with inculcating the civic values and discipline necessary for e¤ective participation in American
democracy, ultimately achieved their aim.
Our work adds to the literature emphasizing the national origins of migrants matters [La
Porta et al. 1998, Acemoglu et al. 2001]. We show the importance of national origins for long run
outcomes through a new mechanism: the policy response of natives. By studying the link between
mass migration and the endogenous policy responses of American-born voters in receiving states,
our analysis provides new micro-foundations for compulsory schooling laws. Our …ndings thus
have important implications for the large literature examining the impacts of compulsion on the
human capital of American-borns. As summarized in Stephens and Yang [2014], this literature
has found rather mixed evidence. Our results suggests this is partly because American-borns were
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not the intended marginal bene…ciary, and that the core purpose of compulsion was to instill civic
values among migrant children. Indeed, our …ndings build on and complement Lleras-Muney and
Shertzer [2015] who show that compulsory schooling laws had signi…cant impacts on the enrolment
rates of migrant children, with smaller impacts on native children.
We conclude by highlighting two further directions for research. First, a wide set of public
policies might have been impacted by large and diverse in‡ows during the Age of Mass Migration.
The most natural policy dimension to study next would be cross-jurisdiction variations in tax
rates used to …nance local public goods, but variations observed in the regulation and operation of
…nancial and legal markets, say, might also originate from di¤erences in patterns of mass migration
into those states during the 19th century [Burchardi et al. 2016, Fulford et al. 2015].31 It also
remains important to understand other policies speci…cally targeted towards immigrants during
the study period. For example, during the early 20th century some states introduced citizenship
requirements for foreigners to be able to vote.32 Such policies presumably held back immigrant
assimilation and sustained greater heterogeneity in values among the population. Hence there
remains a need to understand the political economy trade-o¤s involved that led to the simulta-
neous use of both nation-building e¤orts towards foreigners as well as their political exclusion. A
second direction for future research is to combine the ideas underpinning this analysis with earlier
work that documented high rates of out-migration from the US by Europeans during the Age of
Mass Migration [Bandiera et al. 2013]. This opens up an agenda examining whether returning
Europeans drove institutional and legal change in their home country after having been exposed
to American society.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: For any  ·  and for any  2 R where    we can rewrite
 =  + . Schooling shifts migrant values towards  by . So for  · , as all migrants
have values    this distance becomes  = +(1¡). Introducing compulsory schooling
then gives an American-born individual  ·  utility,
 = ¡
Z
2R
() ¡
Z
2R
()[ + (1¡ ) ] ¡  (13)
= ¡
Z
2R
() ¡
Z
2R
() ¡
Z
2R
() +
Z
2R
() ¡ 
= ¡
Z
2R
() ¡
Z
2R
()[ +  ] +
Z
2R
() ¡ 
Hence the American-born individual  ·  votes for compulsory schooling if R
2R () ¸  ,
that can be re-written as (3). As this inequality is the same for all American-borns with values
 · , a majority of American-borns vote for compulsory schooling if (3) is satis…ed and a
majority vote against otherwise.¥
Proof of Proposition 2: The voter in group  indi¤erent between voting for party  or  is
given by,
¤ = ()¡ () (14)
= ( ¡ )

¹
+ (1())(()¡()) (15)
All voters  in group  with  · ¤ prefer party . Therefore, the share of the electorate that
vote for party  is,
 =
X

 (¤ +
1
2
) (16)
=
X

 (( ¡ )

¹
+ ( 1())(()¡()) + 1
2
) (17)
where   =   is group ’s political weight. Party  wins the election if   12. As both
parties facing the same optimization problem, in equilibrium they announce the same policy. The
equilibrium provision of common schooling is then derived by taking the …rst order condition of
 with respect to  and using the fact that  =  = ¤. Solving gives (7).¥
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A.2 Coding Compulsory Schooling Laws
A.2.1 US States
The data on the year of enactment of compulsory schooling laws (CSL) across US states was
extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972], whose original source was Steinhilber and Sokolowski
[1966]. The Landes and Solomon [1972] data has been compared to alternative sources including
Katz [1976], Leddon [2010], and the Workers’ Compensation Project of Fishback [2000]. Katz
[1976] mentions the dates of CSL enactment for a number of states: they are all in accordance
with the Landes and Solomon data. Leddon [2010] provides a table with the enactment years
of CSL, which correspond exactly to those in Landes and Solomon [1972]. Finally, the Workers
Compensation Project Data does not include Alaska and Hawaii, but coincides with Landes and
Solomon [1972] for all other available states.
A.2.2 European Countries
Our coding of the introduction of compulsory state schooling laws across European countries
relies on primary sources (original laws were consulted whenever possible) and secondary sources
of a scienti…c and o¢cial nature (monographs and papers, mostly written by historians, and
information provided by governments or the European Union). We focus on the …rst establishment
of general compulsory education in the respective territory of interest. We do not explicitly
di¤erentiate between compulsory school attendance and compulsory education, as some countries
allow for home schooling. It should be noted that sources on the history of compulsory education
in di¤erent countries sometimes contradict each other: this is a particular concern for countries
with federal systems (such as Switzerland) and for territories which belonged to di¤erent national
entities over the 19th and 20th century (such as today’s Poland and Germany).
Albania Compulsory schooling was introduced when the country became a monarchy in 1928.
Article 206 of the Royal Constitution, adopted in 1928, states, “The primary education of all
Albanian subjects is obligatory, and the State schools are free” [Hörner et al. 2007, Sefa and
Lushnje 2012].
Armenia Compulsory primary schooling was introduced in 1932 [EFA 2000, Hörner et al. 2007].
Austria-Hungary As part of a comprehensive schooling reform, Maria Theresia signed the
General School Ordinance (Allgemeine Schulordnung) in 1774, which made schooling compulsory
for children of both genders between 6 and 12 throughout most of the Austro-Hungarian territory.
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Article 12 of the ordinance states, “children of both sexes whose parents or guardians do not
have the will or the means to support a tutor should go to school without exception (...) as
soon as they have entered their 6th year”. In order to be allowed to leave school before the
age of 12, children needed to “prove in public exams, and provide a written certi…cate by the
superintendent, that they had learnt all the necessary”.33 The ordinance further stipulates that
municipal authorities in the city and teachers in the country should keep a list of children who
have to attend school and admonish parents to send their children to school. This regulation did
not apply to Hungary, where schooling was however made compulsory in 1777 with the Ratio
Educationis [Melton 1988]. The 1774 law could not be fully enforced, such that analphabetism
remained a widespread phenomenon in Austria in the 19th century. To increase school attendance,
Maria Theresia’s son and successor Joseph II established punishments for non-compliance in 1781.
In 1869, a comprehensive new schooling law (the Reichsvolksschulgesetz) was enacted. It restated
the compulsory character of schooling (Art. II.20) and increased years of compulsory attendance
from 6 to 8 (Art II.21) [Slaje 2009, Donnermair 2010].3435 According to Schneider [1982], the 1869
Reichsvolksschulgesetz achieved compulsory schooling even in rural areas.
Belgium Primary schooling was made compulsory in 1914 with the Loi Poullet [Flora et al.
1983, Wielemans 1991, Colle-Michel 2007, Gathmann et al. 2012].
Denmark Education was …rst made compulsory in Denmark-Norway in 1739, to prepare chil-
dren for con…rmation. Under those provisions, education consisted of the basics of religion and
the reading of familiar texts. In Denmark, writing was added to the curriculum with the 1814
Education Act, when compulsory primary schools were established [Schneider 1982, Flora et al.
1983, Simola 2002, Bandle et al. 2005, Gathmann et al. 2012].
Finland Primary schools were established in 1866 and became compulsory in 1921 with the
Compulsory School Attendance Act. However, universal primary school attendance was only
33“Kinder, beiderlei Geschlechts, deren Ueltern, oder Vormünder in Städten eigene Hauslehrer zu unterhalten
nicht den Willen, oder nicht das Vermögen haben, gehören ohne Ausnahme in die Schule, und zwar sobald sie
das 6te Jahr angetreten haben, von welchem an sie bis zu vollständiger Erlernung der für ihren künftigen Stand,
und Lebensart erforderlichen Gegenstände die deutschen Schulen besuchen müssen; welches sie wohl schwerlich
vor dem 12ten Jahr ihres Lebens, wenn sie im 6ten, oder nach dem 6ten angefangen haben, gründlich werden
vollbringen können; daher es denn gerne gesehen wird, daß Ueltern ihre Kinder wenigstens durch 6 oder 7 Jahre
in den deutschen Schulen liessen (...) Wenn aber einige vor dem 12ten Jahre zu dem Studiren übergehen, oder aus
der Schule entlassen sein wollen; so müssen sie in den ö¤entlichen Prüfungen beweisen, und von dem Schulaufseher
ein schriftliches Zeugnis erhalten, daß sie alles Nöthige wohl erlernet haben”.
34“Die Eltern oder deren Stellvertreter dürfen ihre Kinder oder P‡egebefohlenen nicht ohne den Unterricht lassen,
welcher für die ö¤entlichen Volksschulen vorgeschrieben ist.”
35“Die Schulp‡ichtigkeit beginnt mit dem vollendeten sechsten, und dauert bis zum vollendeted vierzehnten
Lebensjahre.”
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achieved at the time of the Second World War [Flora et al. 1983, Simola 2002].
France In France, law no. 11 696 of March 28, 1882 (Loi Jules Ferry), made primary education
compulsory for children of both sexes aged 6-13 years [Cubberley 1920, Schneider 1982, Flora et
al. 1983, Schriewer 1985]. Its Article 4 states, “primary instruction is compulsory for children of
both sexes from 6 to 13 years of age”.36 Children were allowed to leave school at age 11 if they
passed the public examination for the “certi…cate of primary studies”. A municipal commission
was set up to monitor and encourage school attendance by keeping lists of school-aged children
and taking di¤erent types of measures in case of non-compliance.
Germany Education was made compulsory in Prussia in 1717 with the School Edict (Schuledikt)
enacted by Frederick William I, who “made attendance at village schools compulsory for all chil-
dren not otherwise provided with instruction” [p4, Ramirez and Boli 1987]. According to Stolze,
this was the …rst time Frederick William proclaimed schooling to be compulsory in all Prussian
provinces [Stolze 1911]. This regulation was reiterated by his son Frederick II in his 1763 “Gen-
eral Regulations for Village Schools” (General-Landschul-Reglement), which decreed compulsory
schooling for the entire Prussian monarchy. Article 1 of the general regulations stipulates that “all
subjects sent both their own children and children entrusted to them, boys or girls, from their …fth
year of age on, to school”.37 The regulation stated the school fees to be paid. For those too poor
to a¤ord them, they should be …nanced through church or village donations. The responsibility
to enforce attendance lay with the local preacher and court authorities, who were able to sanction
…nes for non-compliance. The General-Landschul-Reglement did not apply to Catholics and urban
residents. However, a separate edict was promulgated in 1765 for Silesian Catholic schools. Given
widespread opposition, compulsory schooling only became e¤ective over a long period [Ramirez
and Boli 1987, Melton 1988]. In the German Empire, education became compulsory upon uni…ca-
tion in 1871, but precise regulations di¤ered between states (in Bavaria and Wurtemberg, school
was compulsory for children between 7 and 14, whereas in the rest of the Empire, it was for those
aged between 6 and 14) [Flora et al. 1983]. Not only Prussia, but also most of the other German
territories had already introduced compulsory schooling before uni…cation. The …rst state to do so
36“L’instruction primaire est obligatoire pour les enfants des deux sexes âgés des six ans révolus à treize ans
révolus.”
37“Zuvörderst wollen Wir, daß alle Unsere Unterthanen, es mögen denn Eltern, Vormünder oder Herrschaften,
denen die Erziehung der Jugend oblieget, ihre eigene sowol als ihrer P‡ege anvertraute Kinder, Knaben oder
Mädchen, wo nicht eher doch höchstens vom Fünften Jahre ihres Alters in die Schule schicken, auch damit ordentlich
bis ins Dreyzehente und Vierzehente Jahr continuiren und sie so lange zur Schule halten sollen, bis sie nicht nur
das Nöthigste vom Christenthum gefasset haben und fertig lesen und schreiben, sondern auch von demjenigen Red
und Antwort geben können, was ihnen nach den von Unsern Con…storiis verordneten und approbirten Lehrbüchern
beygebracht werden soll.”
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was Palatinate-Zweibrücken in 1592 [Oelkers 2009]. The state of Weimar introduced compulsory
education in 1619 according to Ramirez and Boli [1987], and the Kingdom of Bavaria in 1802
according to De Maeyer [2005], a date which is, however, contradicted by other sources.
Great Britain In England and Wales, the 1870 Elementary Education Act (Forster’s Education
Act) established state responsibility for primary education. Schooling was made compulsory for
children aged between 5 and 13 ten years later, in the Education Act of 1880 [Flora et al. 1983,
Ritter 1986]. In Scotland, education became compulsory for all children between 5 and 13 in 1872
with the Education (Scotland) Act [Flora et al. 1983, Anderson 1995].
Greece Education was made compulsory in a 1834 decree on elementary education, which was
part of the so-called “Bavarian Plan”, an educational reform which took place under the reign of
King Otto, a Prince of Bavaria. [Gkolia and Brundrett 2008, Cowen and Kazamias 2009].
Ireland Schooling was made compulsory in 1892 by the Irish Education Act [Akenson 1970,
Schneider 1982, Flora et al. 1983]. Children were excused from compulsory attendance during
harvest and other seasons during which their labor was needed. Furthermore, children aged
between 11 and 14 could obtain a work permit if they had a “certi…cate of pro…ciency in reading,
writing and arithmetic”. School attendance committees were in charge of enforcing the legislation,
and courts could impose modest …nes on parents who refused to comply. Nonetheless, the law
appeared to have little impact on school attendance during the 19th century [Akenson 1970].
Italy Compulsory schooling in Italy is based on the Legge Casati, enacted in 1859 in the Kingdom
of Sardinia. This law de…ned elementary schooling to consist of two grades, inferior and superior,
each of which takes two years. Article 326 states that “[p]arents, and those who act as their
substitutes, are obliged to procure, in the way they believe most convenient, to their children of
both sexes in the age of attending public elementary school of the inferior grade, the instruction
which is given in those”.38 Elementary education was provided free of charge. The law became
e¤ective in 1860, and was extended to all Italian provinces upon uni…cation. The legal framework
was completed in 1877 with the Legge Coppino, which reiterates the compulsory character of
education in its …rst article: “Boys and girls who have completed the age of six years, and to those
parents or those acting as their substitutes have no procured the necessary instruction (...) have
38“I padri, e coloro che ne fanno le veci, hanno obbligo di procacciare, nel modo che crederanno più conveniente,
ai loro …gli dei du sessi in età di frequentare le scuole pubbliche elementari del grado inferiore, l’istruzione che vien
data nelle medesime.”
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to be sent to the local public school”.39 However, it did not result in universal school attendance
everywhere. Additional laws were hence enacted in 1904 and 1911, which made more stringent
provisions for school attendance and increased state aid for elementary schools [Cubberley 1920,
Schneider 1982, Ramirez and Boli 1987].
Luxembourg Compulsory schooling was introduced in Luxembourg through the 1881 law on
the organisation of primary education [European Commission 2010]. Article 5 of this law states
that “every child of either sex, having completed six years of age at the beginning of the school
year, has to receive during six consecutive years instruction in the subjects listed...”.40 However,
the compulsory character of schooling is re‡ected in earlier laws as well. Article 23 of the 1843
law on primary instruction (which is bilingual) de…nes “children of school-age” (“schulp‡ichtige
Kinder” in its German, “enfans susceptibles de fréquenter l’école” in its French version) as those
between 6 and 12 years of age.41 While the French wording is less explicit, the German wording
“Schulp‡icht” clearly implies an obligation to attend school. Article 56 of the same law even
speci…es sanctions for non-compliance. For example, “indigent parents who habitually neglect
sending their children to school, can be prived from public support.”42 43
Netherlands Compulsory education was introduced in 1900, with “De Leerplichtwet” [Schneider
1982, Flora et al. 1983, Gathmann et al. 2012].
Norway Education was …rst made compulsory in Denmark-Norway in 1739, to prepare children
for con…rmation. Under those provisions, education consisted of the basics of religion and the
reading of familiar texts. In Norway, writing was added to the curriculum in 1827 with a new
primary school law, but children were typically unable to write more than their name and the
letters of the alphabet. Several authors regard the 1827 Primary School Act as the …rst compulsory
39“I fanciulli e le fanciulle che abbiano compiuta l’età di sei anni, e ai quali i genitori o quelli che ne tengono il
luogo non procaccino la necessaria istruzione (...) dovranno essere inviati alla scuola elementare del comune.”
40“Tout enfant de l’un ou de l’autre sexe, âgé de six ans révolus au commencement de l’année scolaire, doit
recevoir pendant six années consécutives l’instruction dans les matières énumérées (...)” / “Jedes Kind beiderlei
Geschlechts, welches bei Beginn des Schuljahres das sechste Lebensjahr zurückgelegt hat, muß während sechs
aufeinander folgender Jahre in den (...) angegebenen Lehrgegenständen unterrichtet werden.”
41Sont considérés comme tels, les enfans qui, á partir du premier octobre de chaque année, ont six ans révolus
et moins de douze ans accomplis (...)” / “Als solche werden diejenigen Kinder betrachtet, welche vom 1. October
jedes Jahres an sechs Jahre zurückgelegt haben und noch nicht volle 12 Jahre alt sind (...)”.
42“Les parens indigens qui négligeront habituellement ’envoyer leurs enfans aux écoles, pourront être privés des
secours publics.” / “Die dürftigen Eltern, die gewohnheitlich unterlassen, ihre Kinder in die Schule zu schicken,
können von den ö¤entlichen Unterstützungen ausgeschlossen werden.”
43Earlier administrative documents, in particular a circular from 1842 and an ordinance from 1840, refer to a
school regulation from 1828. The original text of the 1828 regulation could not be accessed, which is why we could
not determine whether schooling was made …rst made compulsory in 1828 or in 1843.
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schooling law of Norway [Hove 1967, Einhorn 2005]. Still in 1857, 80% of rural children only had
access to ambulant schooling, as there were no schools in their parishes. This changed after the
1860 School Law, which provided for permanent schools instead [Rust 1990]. In 1889, a stricter
compulsory schooling law was enacted, requiring “a more demanding mother tongue subject” and
7 years of primary school attendance [Hove 1967, Bandle et al. 2005].
Poland During the 19th century Poland was partitioned between Prussia, Russia and Austria-
Hungary on three occasions. Education in Poland was, on the one hand, largely determined by
the respective occupier, but re‡ected, on the other hand, the e¤orts of the Polish to upheld their
cultural heritage [Slaje 2009]. In the Prussian part of Poland, compulsory schooling was introduced
in 1825 [Biskup 1983]. Sources are contradictory on whether there was corresponding legislation in
the Austrian and Russian parts during the partition. Shortly after re-obtaining its independence
in 1918, Poland enacted a decree “On Compulsory Schooling” (O obowiazku skolnym) which made
school attendance compulsory for children between 7 and 14 in 1919 [Slaje 2009].
Portugal Compulsory schooling was …rst introduced in Portugal in 1835, with the Regulamento
Geral da Instrucção Primaria. In Title VII, Article 1, it states that “To the obligation imposed,
by the constitution, on the government to provide all citizens with primary education, corresponds
the obligation of parents to send their children to public schools, as soon as the pass 7 years (...)
if they don’t have the means to educate them otherwise”.44 The responsibility for enforcement
rested on municipal authorities and priests.45
Russia Compulsory education for children between 6 and 17 years of age was introduced shortly
after the success of the October Revolution, with the Dekret ot “ob Edinoy Trudovoy Shkole
Rossiyskoy Sozialisticheskoy Federativnoy Sovetskoy Respubliki (Polojenie)” (Decree on the Uni-
…ed Labour School of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) of October 16, 1918 [Pres-
idential Library 2013].
Spain The …rst law to regulate education in Spain was the 1838 Law of Primary Instruction
(Ley de Instrucción Primaria). It was accompanied by a Plan of Primary Instruction (Plan de
Instrucción Primaria), which stipulates the obligation of villages and cities to provide primary
44“A obrigação imposta, pela Carta Constitucional, ao Governo de proporcionar a todos os Cidadãos a Instrucção
Primaria, corresponde a obrigação dos Pais de familia de enviar seus …lhos às Escòlas Publicas, logo de passem de
7 annos, (...), se meios não tiverem de o fazer construir de outro modo.”
45“A’s Camaras Municipaes, e aos Parochos incumbe o procurar mover por todos os meios de que poderem usar,
os Pais de familia a cumprir com esta importante obrigação...”
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schools (Art. 7-10). Furthermore, its Article 26 states that “[a]s it is an obligation of parents to
procure for their children, and for guardians to procure for the persons under their responsibility,
the amount of instruction which can make them useful for society and for themselves, the local
commissions will assure by the means their prudence dictates them to stimulate parents and
guardians to comply with this important duty, applying at the same time all their enlightenment
and zeal to the removal of obstacles which would impede it,”, remaining thus highly vague with
respect to the content and form of such an instruction.46
Compulsory education was introduced with the Law of Public Instruction of September 9, 1857
[De Maeyer 2005, Gathmann et al. 2012]. Article 7 states that “Elementary primary education
is compulsory for all Spanish. The parents and guardians must send their children and wards to
public schools from the age of six to nine years; unless they provide them su¢ciently with this
type of instruction in their homes or in private establishments”.47
Sweden Compulsory education was introduced in 1842 with the Folkskolestadgan [Schneider
1982, Soysal and Strang 1989, Simola 2002].
Switzerland With the adoption of the Swiss Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassung) of 1874,
primary schooling became mandatory in all Swiss cantons [Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft 1874,
Muller 2007]. Article 27.2 states that “Cantons provide su¢cient primary education, which shall
be exclusively under the control of the state. It is compulsory and, in public schools, free of
charge.”48 However, compulsory schooling had been introduced previously by di¤erent cantons at
di¤erent points in time. Sources contradict each other in terms of the dates of introduction. For
example, Forster [2008] dates the introduction of compulsory schooling in Geneva in 1536, whereas
Muller [2007] sets it at 1872.
A.3 Robustness Checks
Our …rst robustness check exploits within-country variation over time in exposure to compulsory
state schooling. To do so, we consider the impact of a rolling window of Europeans’ exposure to
46Siendo una obligacion de los padres procurar á sus hijos, y lo mismo los tutores y curadores á las personas con-
…adas á su cuidado, aquel grado de instruccion que pueda hacerlos útiles á la sociedad y á si mismos, las Comisiones
locales procurarán por cuantos medios les dicte su prudencia estimular á los padres y tutores al cumplimiento de
este deber importante, aplicando al propio tiempo toda su ilustracion y su celo á la remocion de los obstáculos que
lo impidan.”
47“La primera enseñanza elemental es obligatoria para todos los españoles. Los padres y tutores o encargados
enviarán a las Escuelas públicas a sus hijos y pupilos desde la edad de seis años hasta la de nueve; a no ser que les
proporcionen su…cientemente esta clase de instrucción en sus casas o en establecimiento particular”.
48“Die Kantone sorgen für genügenden Primarunterricht, welcher ausschliesslich unter staatlicher Leitung stehen
soll. Derselbe ist obligatorisch und in den ö¤entlichen Schulen unentgeltlich.”
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compulsory schooling and measure whether the American median-voter is di¤erentially sensitive to
the presence of European migrants that have passed compulsory schooling at least 30 years earlier.
Figure 2 makes clear that using a rolling window for Europeans’ exposure to compulsory schooling
adds in those countries that pass compulsory schooling between 1850 and 1880 (Spain, Switzerland,
Italy and Britain) and so might impact the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling in the US
from 1910 onwards. Column 1 of Table A5 shows that with this de…nition the sharp contrast
between how American-borns react to di¤erent types of European migrant becomes even more
pronounced.
Another way to examine di¤erential responses over time to migrants from the same origin
country is to focus in on second generation migrants. They are American-born and coded as such,
but the next speci…cation splits American-borns between those with American-born parents and
those with at least one foreign-born parent. This latter group of individuals form an additional
group  that can then also be controlled for (we then also control for the group characteristics
of second generation immigrants in ). Column 2 in Table A5 shows the result: the passage of
compulsory schooling is not signi…cantly impacted by the presence of second generation migrants,
rather it is the composition of more recent foreign-born migrants that drives the policy response
of US states.
A.3.1 Other Legislation
The next set of robustness checks address concerns our core …nding might be spuriously picking up
alternative mechanisms by including additional controls in (4). First, we consider the passage of
other pieces of state legislation, that might be complementary to, or pre-requisites for, the passage
of compulsory schooling. For example, the passage of child labor laws and the establishment of a
birth registration system have been argued to be interlinked with compulsory schooling [Lleras-
Muney 2002, Goldin and Katz 2003]. Column 3 of Table A5 shows the baseline results to be
unchanged if we additionally control for whether a state has child labor laws or a system of
birth registration. Given the stability of our coe¢cients of interest, this …nding further implies
migrant groups were not di¤erentially attracted to states based on these legislative and regulatory
characteristics.49
A second concern is that some states might be more progressive than others, in that they are
more likely to pass compulsory schooling, but also be more likely to universal su¤rage or to allow
women property rights and over their own earnings. If migrants from European countries are
49The coding for child labor laws are extracted from Moehling [1999, Table 1] as these extend back to the mid-
1800s (an updating coding is also provided in Lleras-Muney and Shertzer.[2015] for the 1910-39 period); the coding
for the introduction of birth registration proofs is extracted from Fagernas [2014].
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di¤erentially likely to locate to such progressive states (as a function of their country of origin’s
own legislative history), our earlier result would be spurious. To check for this we then additionally
control for both state characteristics. Column 4 shows that neither having universal su¤rage nor
property rights for women have signi…cant impacts on the passage of compulsory schooling in the
state (neither hazard signi…cantly di¤ers from one). Moreover, the impacts of the presence of
di¤erent migrant groups replicate the baseline …ndings.
Finally, we consider additionally controlling for the presence of European migrants from coun-
tries that have passed other pieces of legislation, apart from compulsory schooling, that might
relate to migrant values. For example, we consider whether the American-born median voter
responds to the presence of Europeans from countries with child labor laws in place since 1850.
Column 5 shows there is no impact of having migrants in the state from European countries with
a long history of child labor laws, that might otherwise have re‡ected the passage of compulsory
schooling as being driven by the child-related preferences of migrants (and natives), rather than
compulsory schooling being driven by the desire of the American-born median voter to homogenize
certain incoming migrants.
A.3.2 Alternative Econometric Speci…cations
We next document the robustness of our core …nding to using alternative econometric speci…ca-
tions. We impose more parametric structure on the underlying hazard, 0(), using a log logistic
model. When estimating this model, time ratios are reported.50 Recall that a time ratio less
than one has the same interpretation as a hazard greater than one, indicating the covariate is
associated with the passage of compulsory schooling earlier in time. Column 1 in Table A6 shows
that imposing this parametric structure leaves our core …ndings unchanged: (i) the passage of
compulsory schooling occurs signi…cantly earlier in time when a greater share of the population
comprises European migrants without historic exposure to compulsory schooling; (ii) the time
ratio on Europeans with historic exposure to compulsory schooling is above one and these time
ratios are signi…cantly di¤erent between the European migrant groups; (iii) compulsory schooling
is passed signi…cantly earlier in time when a greater share of the population is non-European born.
All these …ndings to continue to hold when we allow for there to be cross-state heterogeneity in
hazard rates as captured by a frailty parameter (Column 2).
We next move away from survival models and use a linear probability regression, following
some of the earlier literature examining the passage of compulsory schooling. Such models use
50In the log logistic model the hazard rate is characterized as () = 
1
 
( 1

¡1)
[1+()
1
 ]
, where  = exp¡(). This
has two parameters:  is the location parameter and  is the shape parameter, allowing for non-monotonic hazards.
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all state-years (not just those pre-adoption) to essentially estimate the probability that state 
has compulsory schooling in place, and are equivalent to a survival model assuming duration
independence in the passage of legislation. Column 3 shows the result: using a regression model
we …nd no signi…cant partial correlation between the population shares of either European migrant
grouping and the likelihood compulsory schooling is passed, although an increase in the population
share of non-Europeans does have a positive and signi…cant impact, consistent with earlier work
[Landes and Solomon 1972, Lleras-Muney and Shertzer 2015]. The reason why the OLS and
survival results di¤er is that the assumption of duration independence is strongly rejected in our
data: history does matter and so the hazard of passing legislation, 0(), varies over census years ,
a result demonstrated in the unparameterized Cox proportional hazard model, and the parametric
log logistic speci…cation.
A.3.3 Alternative Classi…cations
We now consider alternative ways to group European countries by their exposure to compulsory
state schooling. We …rst regroup countries using the lower and upper bound de…nitions of the
introduction of compulsory schooling (shown in Table A2). The results are in Columns 4 and 5
of Table A6: our core baseline result is robust to using the lower bound de…nition and so narrow-
ing down the focus on those European countries that have the longest exposure to compulsory
schooling at home. Using the upper bound de…nitions, the results suggest compulsory schooling
is signi…cantly less likely to be passed in the presence of European migrants with exposure to
compulsory schooling at home, and the hazard of compulsory schooling being passed across US
states remains signi…cantly di¤erently related to the two groups of European migrant, with and
without compulsory schooling at home [p-value= 005].
A.4 Internal Migration
A.4.1 American-borns
If the passage of compulsory schooling was an instrument used by states to attract American
migrants (or Americans took ideas over compulsory schooling with them as they migrated across
states), and that the location of the foreign-born groups we focus on in Table 2 is interlinked with
the internal migration of white American-borns, this would generate a spurious correlation between
the presence of these foreign-born groups and the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling. To
check for this, we use data on the internal migration of Americans from the 1880 census to plot
the cross-state variation in Americans born out-of-state (but in the US) and the foreign-born
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population group shares core to our analysis ( 1880). Figure A3 shows the result (and line of
best …t): we …nd no signi…cant relationship between the population share of out-of-state American-
borns, with the population shares of Europeans with and without long exposure to compulsory
schooling at home, or non-Europeans. This suggests our …ndings are not merely picking up the
internal migration of white American-borns.51
A.4.2 Foreign-borns
We can further check whether the passage of compulsory schooling in state  by census year , is
associated with subsequent changes in the composition of the migrant population within the state.
This sheds light on the narrower issue of whether any process by which natives and migrants sort
into states is signi…cantly altered by the introduction of compulsory schooling law. We use two
speci…cations to check for whether population trends shift in response to compulsory schooling:
  = 1( = 1) +  +  +
X

(

1850) +  (18)
  = +  [(¡ )1( = 1)] +  +  (19)
where   corresponds to measures of the state-year population, and 1( = 1) is a dummy
for whether compulsory schooling law has been adopted in state  by census year . Speci…cation
(18) allows for a complete set of state and year …xed e¤ects ( ), and also allows for there to
be long run reversion to the mean in populations across states, as captured in the  1850 term.
Speci…cation (19) is a standard trend break model, that allows for state …xed e¤ects, but assumes
population follows a linear time trend () and then tests for a break in this linear trend in the
years after compulsory schooling law has been adopted in state .
Table A8 presents the results: Panel A shows estimates of  from (18), and Panel B shows
estimates of  and  from (19). In Columns 1 to 3 we focus on the partial correlation between the
passage of compulsory schooling in a state on the subsequent total state population ( =
P
 

).
Examining Panel A, we see that unconditionally, states with compulsory schooling subsequently
have signi…cantly larger populations, but this result is not robust: including state …xed e¤ects
reduces the magnitude of the partial correlation by 90%, and allowing for reversion to the mean
eliminates any signi…cant correlation between the total population and the earlier passage of
compulsory schooling. Columns 4 to 7 focus on the composition of the foreign-born population
in the state. We …nd no evidence that after compulsory schooling laws are passed, the foreign
51Rocha et al. [2015] provide long run evidence on the economic/industrial development of Brazilian municipal-
ities that explicitly used settlement policies to attract high skilled migrants into them in the late 19th and early
20th century.
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born population, European migrants from countries with a long history of compulsory schooling,
European migrants from countries without a long history of compulsory schooling, or the ratio of
the two groups of European migrant, are signi…cantly di¤erent. These results go …rmly against the
idea that native or migrant population movements are endogenously driven by the earlier passage
of compulsory schooling in a state. Equally, the results suggests migrant groups were not resisting
the civic values being imparted onto them via compulsory schooling by moving to other states.
These conclusions are reinforced if we move to Panel B where (19) is estimated: we again …nd little
evidence of native or migrant populations being responsive to the earlier passage of compulsory
schooling (b = 0 in …ve out of six speci…cations).
A.5 IV Method
We use a control function (CF) approach to implement an instrumental variables strategy based
on a Bartik-Card style instrument for migrant shares. The non-linear hazard model in (4) is a
special case of a generalized regression model:  =  ( ) for  : R ! R a known non-
degenerate and monotonic function and  : R2 ! R monotonic in each variable [Han 1987].52 To
overcome potential endogeneity of one of the regressors in such generalized regression models, the
CF approach can be adopted where the unobservable covariate is directly controlled for (rather
than instrumenting the endogenous variable as for 2SLS linear models). Terza et al. [2008a, 2008b]
and Wooldridge [2010] show the consistency of such a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) methods
for non-linear models.
To make explicit the nature of the endogeneity problem, we …rst let  denote the exogenous
variables (, ) and add a state-migrant-speci…c unobservable to the empirical speci…cation
in (4), denoted  , with  an £ matrix of state-migrant unobservables. These unobservables
enter additively in the proportional hazard model, that can be written in the regression form,
() = exp(¡ ¡  ¡ ) +  (20)
where () =
R 
0
() is the integrated hazard function,  » (1), with  ? (  ),
 ?  but  6? . Hence the migrant shares are endogenous in that they correlate with
unobservable determinants of compulsory schooling law. The endogenous migration shares  
are assumed to relate to some instrument   according to the following parametric model,
  = 

 + 

 + 

 (21)
52For the Cox proportional hazard model,  = ¡1(+) with  () = log
R 
0 () , and  being the hazard
function,   0, ()  0, and  »  (1) [Han 1987].
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where  is an error term. We assume the rank condition holds, that the instruments are exogenous
(  ?  ) and that E[j ] = 0. The unobserved   component can be decomposed
into a term that is potentially correlated with   and a residual,
  = 


0 + 

 (22)
where  ? , and wlog, E[exp()] = 1. The key to the CF approach is to obtain the population
expectation conditional on  , which under the above assumptions is,
E[()j  ] = exp(¡ ¡  ¡ ) (23)
where  is a  £  matrix of residuals from (21). In the …rst stage, consistent estimates of (^,
^) are obtained by OLS, and predicted values of the residuals are obtained as ^

 = 

 ¡ ^ . In
the second stage, ^ = (^1  ^

) is then included in (23),
E[()j  ^] = exp(¡ ¡  ¡ ^) (24)
If the …rst stage is correctly speci…ed, estimating this exponential regression model conditioning
on ^ gives consistent estimates of ( ) [Wooldridge 2010]. The need to include additional
covariates when estimating the second stage equation is demanding given our data dimensions:
hence we …rst present result from the most parsimonious model that excludes the exogenous
covariates  = (

, ) from both stages.
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Table 1: Characteristics of American-Borns and Migrant Groups
Sample period for State Descriptives: Census years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law
Sample period for County Descriptives: 1880 (based on 100% census sample)
Columns 1 to 4: Mean, overall standard deviation (SD) in parentheses, between SD in brackets, within SD in braces
In Columns 5 and 6, p-values on t-tests are reported in brackets
(1) American
Born
(2) European Born from
Countries that did NOT
have CSL in 1850
(3) European Born
from Countries that
had CSL in 1850
(4) Non-European
Foreign Born
(5) Test of Equality
[Col 2 = Col 3]
(6) Within State
Test of Equality
[Col 2 = Col 3]
A. State Level
Population (10,000s) 76.5 4.60 3.14 .862
(81.8) (9.91) (5.89) (1.75)
SD Between States [70.3] [10.4] [5.36] [1.38]
SD Within State (over census years) {45.1} {2.51} {2.79} {1.08}
Share of Adults (aged 15+) that are Illiterate .204 .102 .046 .166
(.350) (.074) (.096) (.225)
Enrolment Rate (8-14 year olds) .570 .297 .441 .331
(.245) (.326) (.328) (.368)
Share Aged 0-15 .445 .081 .065 .156
(.097) (.066) (.078) (.162)
Share in Labor Force .305 .585 .609 .486
(.108) (.156) (.200) (.252)
Share Residing on a Farm .501 .225 .243 .261
(.189) (.180) (.238) (.274)
Mean Occupational Score 18.2 21.1 22.2 19.4
(2.94) (3.90) (7.14) (7.36)
B. County Level
Share of County Population .894 .041 .040 .025
(.136) (.057) (.066) (.072)
SD Between States [.121] [.051] [.049] [.048]
SD Within State (over counties) {.085} {.041} {.043} {.061}
[.333]
[.011]
[.188]
[.378]
[.300]
[.160]
[.008]
[.345]
[.011] [.016]
[.335]
Notes: In Panel A, the unit of observation is the state-census year. All variables are constructed from the IPUMS-USA census data using individual weights. For each state, the sample period starts from 1850 and
covers all census years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling laws. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In Panel B, the unit of
observation is the county in 1880. All variables are constructed from the IPUMS-USA 100% 1880 census sample. County populations are measured in shares. For both Panels, in Column 1, the American born are
those whose recorded nativity is native born. In Column 2, the European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal
and Sweden. All other European countries are included in Column 3. In the first row, populations are measured in 10,000s. Adults are defined to be aged 15 and above when defining the share of adults that are
illiterate, and enrolment rates for 8-14 year olds are the share of this group that report being in school. The occupational score is a constructed variable from IPUMS-USA that assigns each occupation in all years a
value representing the median total income (in hundreds of 1950 dollars) of all persons with that particular occupation in 1950. The occupational score thus provides a continuous measure of occupations, according to
the economic rewards enjoyed by people working at them in 1950. Column 5 reports the p-value on a test of the null hypothesis that the values in Columns 2 and 3 are equal – this is derived from an OLS regression
allowing standard errors to be clustered by region. Column 6 reports the p-value on the same test where we additionally control for state fixed effects.
[.153]
[.246]
[.180]
[.215]
[.822]
Table 2: The Composition of Migrants and the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws
Non parametric Cox proportional hazard model estimates, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; Populations shares and enrolment rates measured in effect sizes
(1) Foreign (2) European (3) Civic Values (4) OtherCharacteristics
Share of the State Population that is:
Foreign Born 1.24*
(.142)
European Born 1.43**
(.226)
1.64*** 2.15***
(.225) (.509)
.988 .780
(.122) (.161)
Non-European Born .998 .995 1.80***
(.041) (.035) (.409)
Enrolment Rate of American-Borns 2.82**
(1.39)
.815*
(.094)
1.03
(.153)
1.18
(.235)
Group Controls No No No Yes
State Controls No No No Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value] [.005] [.004]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.001] [.505]
Observations (state-census year) 230 230 230 230
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are
reported. Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is equal to one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census
years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is passed. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is
extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population
shares from census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. Robust standard errors are reported. The European countries defined to
have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In Column 4 we
control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the
share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, and the share residing on a farm. We also control
for the following state characteristics: the total population and the average occupational score of the population. We also control for the enrolment rate of 8-
14 year olds among American borns (in effect sizes), and group specific enrolment rates in US schools for all European and non-European groups in the
state (in effect sizes). At the foot of Column 3 onwards we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two
European groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the non-European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that
did not have compulsory schooling in place in 1850.
From European Countries that had CSL in 1850
From European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850
Enrolment Rate in US, of Europeans From
Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850
Enrolment Rate in US, of Europeans From
Countries that had CSL in 1850
Enrolment Rate in US, of Non-European Foreign-
Borns
Table 3: Regional Variation in the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws
Non parametric Cox proportional hazard model estimates, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; Populations shares and enrolment rates measured in effect sizes
(1) Exclude
Western States
(2) Exclude
Southern States
(3) Only Western and
Southern States
(4) Established
States
Share of the State Population that is:
From European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 5.55*** 1.33 4.62** 3.16**
(2.50) (.388) (2.94) (1.64)
From European Countries that had CSL in 1850 .857 .710 .270** 1.52
(.197) (.188) (.167) (.506)
Non-European Born 1.37 1.72 1.60 1.73***
(.337) (.603) (.512) (.302)
Group Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value] [.000] [.024] [.016] [.094]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.004] [.556] [.091] [.201]
Observations (state-census year) 186 133 141 187
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for
significance relate to the null that the coefficient is equal to one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once
compulsory schooling is passed. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. Robust standard errors are reported. In
Column 4 the 36 states that are observed in all 8 IPUMS census waves from 1850 to 1930 are included in the sample. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. In all
Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares from census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling
law. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all
Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-
15, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, and the share residing on a farm. We also control
for the following state characteristics: the total population and the average occupational score of the population. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null
hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two European groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the non-European immigrant groups
and European borns from countries that did not have compulsory schooling in place in 1850.
Table 4: Endogenous Location Choice of Migrants, Second Stage 2SRI-IV Estimates
Non parametric Cox proportional and log logistic hazard model estimates
Robust standard errors; Populations shares and enrolment rates measured in effect sizes
(1) NP Cox PH (2) Log logistic(Time Ratio)
(3) Log logistic
(Time Ratio)
(4) Log logistic
(Time Ratio)
Share of the State Population that is:
From European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 1.65** .920*** .906*** .923***
(.382) (.022) (.020) (.018)
From European Countries that had CSL in 1850 1.15 .098 .098* .986
(.152) (.012) (.011) (.015)
Non-European Born .85 .994 .990 .946***
(.125) (.014) (.012) (.009)
Includes First Stage Residuals [OLS] Yes Yes No No
Includes First Stage Residuals [Non-parametric] No No Yes Yes
Group Controls No No No Yes
State Controls No No No Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value] [.262] [.056] [.013] [.011]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.019] [.030] [.006] [.217]
Gamma Parameter .048*** .044*** .017***
(.007) (.007) (.003)
Observations (state-census year) 180 180 180 180
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. In Column 1 a non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. In Columns 2
to 4 a log logistic hazard model is estimated where time ratios are reported. In all cases tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is equal to one. The unit of observation is
the state-census year, for all census years from 1860. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is passed. Robust standard errors are reported. The year of passage of
compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using
population shares from census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are
Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. We control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with
and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds, the labor force
participation rate, and the share residing on a farm. We also control for the following state characteristics: the total population and the average occupational score of the population. All
Columns control for the first stage residuals in the 2SRI method. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same for the two
European groups, and the p-value that the coefficients are the same for the non-European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have compulsory schooling
in place in 1850. At the foot of Columns 2 to 4 the relevant parameters from the parametric hazard and frailty parameters are reported.
Table 5: Other Sources of Within-Migrant Diversity
Non parametric Cox proportional model, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; Populations shares measured in effect sizes
(1) Religion (2) EuropeanRegion (3) Language
Share of the State Population that is From:
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Protestant 1.22
(.234)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Catholic/Other 2.39***
(.596)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Protestant .598*
(.176)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Catholic/Other .840***
(.044)
Non-European Born 2.29*** 2.08** 1.83***
(.609) (.639) (.227)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Northern/Scandinavian 1.89
(.837)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Southern/Eastern 1.16*
(.099)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Northern/Scandinavian .698
(.162)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Southern/Eastern .883***
(.038)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, English Speaking 1.66*
(.494)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Non English Speaking 1.25
(.311)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850 (all Non English Speaking) .776
(.127)
Group and State Controls Yes Yes Yes
With CSL = Without CSL, Protestant [.052]
With CSL = Without CSL, Catholic/Other [.000]
With CSL = Without CSL, Northern European [.066]
With CSL = Without CSL, Southern/Eastern European [.003]
With CSL (All Non English) = Without CSL, Non English [.057]
Observations (state-census year) 230 230 230
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported.
Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state
drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is passed. Robust standard errors are reported. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws
is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population
shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in
1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group
(American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850, as well as the one additional group defined in each column): the
share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds and the share
residing on a farm. In all Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total population, and the average occupational score of the population. In
Column 1, we use the Barro and McCleary [1985] data to define country religion. The following European countries are then defined to be Protestant: Britain,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Holland, Norway and Switzerland. In Column 2, Northern Europe/Scandinavian countries are defined to be Belgium, Britain,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Iceland, Ireland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. In Column 3, English speaking
European countries are Britain and Ireland (both without compulsory schooling in 1850). At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis
that the hazard coefficients are the same between various European groups with and without compulsory schooling in 1850.
Non parametric Cox proportional model, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; Populations shares measured in effect sizes
(1) Redistribution (2) Industrialization (3) Land Inequality (4) Republicans (5) Democrats
Share of the State Population that is From:
European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 2.14*** 2.38*** 1.84** 2.62*** 3.00***
(.470) (.520) (.461) (.858) (1.04)
European Countries that had CSL in 1850 .831 .819 .901 .915 1.02
(.160) (.148) (.196) (.180) (.170)
Non-European Countries 1.82*** 2.01** 2.14*** 1.77** 1.62*
(.389) (.554) (.518) (.455) (.459)
SD of Occupational Income Score 1.38
(.423)
Share of Labor Force Engaged in Professional Occupations 1.00
(.000)
Share of Labor Force Engaged in Craft Occupations 2.51*
(1.32)
Share of Labor Force Engaged in Operative Occupations .550
(.296)
Land Share of Top 20% of Holdings [Galor et al . 2009] .815
(.171)
Republican Party Vote Share in Congressional Elections 1.68*
(.455)
Democratic Party Vote Share in Congressional Elections .558***
(.105)
Group and State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
European Groups Equal (with and without CSL) [p-
value] [.003] [.000] [.025] [.002] [.003]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.513] [.549] [.591] [.331] [.135]
Observations (state-census year) 230 230 216 148 148
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate to
the null that the coefficient is one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling laws are passed. Robust
standard errors are reported. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in
effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling
laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-
European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850, as well as the one additional group defined in each column): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that
are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds and the share residing on a farm. In all Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total
population, and the average occupational score of the population. Column 1 controls for the state-year standard deviation in the occupational index score. Column 2 controls for the share of the
population defined to be working in craft occupations, and operative occupations (where professional occupations are the omitted category). Column 3 controls for the land share of the largest 20% of
farm land holdings, from [Galor et al . 2009], to proxy inequality of land holdings. This is available for 1880, 1900 and 1920: we linearly interpolate it for other state-census years. Column 4 (5) controls
for the vote share of the Republican (Democratic) party in congressional elections: these are available only in census years from 1860 onwards for a subset of states. At the foot of each Column we
report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two European groups.
Table 6: Alternative Mechanisms Driving the Passage of Compulsory Schooling
Table 7: The Composition of Migrants and the Provision of Common Schools
OLS estimates, robust standard errors
Dependent variable: Log common school teachers in county
County populations measured in effect sizes
(1) Migrant
Groups (2) State FE (3) Controls
County Population that is:
American Born .298*** .239*** .029**
(.060) (.042) (.011)
European Born from Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 -.180*** -.176*** -.040***
(.032) (.024) (.011)
European Born from Countries that had CSL in 1850 .058* .076*** .036***
(.034) (.025) (.007)
Non-European Born .120*** .078*** .017***
(.018) (.012) (.005)
Mean of Dependent Variable (in levels)
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Group and County Controls No No Yes
American = European Born without CSL [p-value] [.000] [.000] [.002]
European Groups Equal (with and without CSL) [p-value] [.000] [.000] [.000]
Observations (county) 2472 2472 2472
133
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is a county, and the sample covers counties from 45
states. The dependent variable is the log of the number of white teachers in the county. All outcomes are measured in 1890. All right hand side
controls are measured in 1880, and derived from the 100% IPUMS-USA census sample. OLS regression estimates are shown, where robust
standard errors are estimated, and observations are weighted by the county population. In all Columns population groupings are all defined in
effect sizes, where this is calculated from population numbers in the cross section of counties in 1890. The European countries defined to have
had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. Column 2
onwards includes state fixed effects. In Column 3 we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European,
European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the labor force participation rate, the share residing on a
farm, and the average occupational income score. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the coefficients
are the same for various pairs of groups.
RED = Northeast, GREEN= Midwest, YELLOW = West, BLUE = South
Enrolment Rates (5-14 year olds)
Figure 1: The Educated American
Figure 2: Timeline for Passage of Compulsory Schooling, by US State and European Country
Notes: Enrollment rates represent students enrolled in public and/or private schools for children aged 5-14. The enrollment rates are extracted from: (i) Lindert [2004] for Austria (1830-1870); Belgium (1830,1840,1860); France (1830,1840); Greece (1860);
Ireland (1860); Italy (1830,1850,1860); Japan (1860); the Netherlands (1850, 1860); Norway (1830-1860,1890); Portugal (1850,1880); Spain (1850,1860,1890); the US (1830,1840) (ii) Flora et al. [1983] for Austria-Hungary (1891); Belgium (1850,1869,1881);
Ireland (1890); Italy (1890); Norway (1870,1880); the UK (1850,1870-1890); Prussia (1871,1882,1891) (iii) Benavot and Riddle [1988] for Austria (1880); France (1870,1890); Greece (1870,1880); Ireland (1870,1880); Italy (1870,1880); Japan (1870-1890); the
Netherlands (1870-1890); Spain (1870); the US (1870-1890). All other rates were calculated using enrollments from Banks and Wilson [2011] and the total population between 5-14 years old from Mitchell [2007a, 2007b] for France (1851,1861,1881); Greece
(1889); Portugal (1864,1875,1890); Spain (1877,1887); the UK (1861); the US (1850,1860).
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
US Norway France NL Belgium Austria Spain UK
Ireland Italy Japan Greece Portugal
Before 1850: Austria-Hungary
(1774), Denmark (1814), Sweden
(1842), Norway (1827), Germany
(1717), Greece (1834), Portugal
(1835)
Spain
Massachusetts
Canada
Japan
Vermont
New Hampshire, Michigan,
Washington
Connecticut
Nevada
New York, Kansas, California
Switzerland
Maine, New Jersey
Wyoming
Ohio
Italy
Wisconsin
Britain
France
Illinois, Montana, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Rhode Island
Minnesota
Nebraska, Idaho
Colorado, Oregon
Utah
New
Mexico
Ireland
Pennsylvania
Hawaii, Kentucky
Indiana,
West Virginia
Arizona
Netherlands
Iowa, Maryland
Luxemburg
Missouri,
Tennessee
Delaware, North Carolina,
Oklahoma
Virginia
Arkansas
Louisiana
Russia
Belgium
Alabama, Florida, South Carolina,
Texas
Georgia
Mississippi
Alaska
Finland
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
Compulsory Schooling Law
Poland
Albania
Armenia
(1932)
Figure 3: Demand for Common Schooling in 1890, by Population Groups and Compulsory Schooling Law
Notes: The Panels show coefficient estimates and robust standard errors from an OLS regression in which the unit of observation is a county, and the sample covers counties from 45 states. The dependent variable in
Panel A is the log of the number of white teachers in the county. The dependent variable in Panel B is the log of the number of enrolled white pupils in the county. All outcomes are measured in 1890. All controls in the
regressions are measured in 1880, and derived from the 100% IPUMS-USA census sample. Observations are weighted by the county population. In all Panels, the four population groups are controlled for, as well as an
interaction between each group and whether compulsory schooling laws are in place in the state prior to and including 1890 (the other controls in each regression are state fixed effects, the average occupational score of
the county population, the log of the county population aged 0 to 15, and the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the
share aged 0-15, the labor force participation rate, the share residing on a farm, and the average occupational income score). Population groupings are all defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated from population
numbers in the cross section of counties in 1890. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and
Sweden. In each Panel, the left hand side figure shows the coefficient on the population grouping in the pre-compulsion period. The right hand side figure shows the coefficient on the interaction between the population
grouping and the compulsory schooling law dummy.
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Alabama 1817 1819 1915 8 - 14 1910 1908
Alaska 1959 1929
Arizona 1863 1912 1899 8 - 14 after 1910 1909
Arkansas 1819 1836 1909 8 - 14 1910 1914
California 1850 1874 8 - 14 1890 1905
Colorado 1861 1876 1889 8 - 14 1890 1907
Connecticut 1788 1872 7 - 14 1890 1897
Delaware 1787 1907 7 - 14 after 1910 1881
Florida 1822 1845 1915 8 - 12 1910 1899
Georgia 1788 1916 8 - 12 1910 1919
Hawaii 1959 1896
Idaho 1863 1890 1887 8 - 14 1910 1911
Illinois 1809 1818 1883 7 - 14 1900 1916
Indiana 1800 1816 1897 7 - 14 1890 1908
Iowa 1838 1846 1902 7 - 14 1910 1880
Kansas 1854 1861 1874 8 - 14 1910 1911
Kentucky 1792 1896 7 - 14 1910 1911
Louisiana 1804 1812 1910 - 14 1890 1918
Maine 1820 1875 7 - 14 1890 1892
Maryland 1788 1902 8 - 12 1900 1898
Massachusetts 1788 1852 7 - 14 before 1880 1841
Michigan 1805 1837 1871 7 - 14 1890 1906
Minnesota 1858 1885 8 - 14 1900 1872
Mississippi 1798 1817 1918 7 - 12 1910 1912
Missouri 1821 1905 8 - 14 1900 1910
Montana 1864 1889 1883 8 - 14 1910 1907
Nebraska 1867 1887 7 - 14 1890 1904
Nevada 1861 1864 1873 8 - 14 after 1910 1911
New Hampshire 1788 1871 8 - 14 before 1880 1883
New Jersey 1787 1875 7 - 14 before 1880 1878
New Mexico 1850 1912 1891 7 - after 1910 1920
New York 1788 1874 7 - 14 1890 1880
North Carolina 1789 1907 8 - 12 1910 1914
North Dakota 1861 1889 1883 8 - 14 1900 1907
Ohio 1803 1877 8 - 14 1890 1909
Oklahoma 1890 1907 1907 8 - 14 1910 1917
Oregon 1848 1859 1889 9 - 14 1910 1903
Pennsylvania 1787 1895 8 - 14 before 1880 1906
Rhode Island 1790 1883 7 - 14 before 1880 1896
South Carolina 1788 1915 8 - 14 1910 1915
South Dakota 1861 1889 1883 8 - 14 1910 1905
Tennessee 1790 1796 1905 8 - 14 1900 1914
Texas 1845 1915 8 - 12 1910 1903
Utah 1850 1896 1890 8 - after 1910 1905
Vermont 1791 1867 8 - 12 before 1880
Virginia 1788 1908 8 - 12 1910 1912
Washington 1853 1889 1871 8 - 14 1910 1907
West Virginia 1863 1897 8 - 12 1900 1925
Wisconsin 1836 1848 1879 7 - 12 before 1880 1908
Wyoming 1868 1890 1876 7 - after 1910 1909
Table A1: Year of Passage of Laws, by US State*
Notes and Sources:
* The District of Columbia is not included as it is a federal district.
1 Year when the territory joined the Union [extracted from Braun and Kvasnicka 2013]
2 Year when the state joined the Union [extracted from US Census Office]
3 Year of introduction of compulsory school attendance laws [extracted from Landes and Solomon 1972]
4 Year of introduction of child labor laws for manufacturing employment [extracted from Moehling 1999]
5 Age groups that compulsory schooling laws applied to when the laws were introduced (i.e., the closest year available) [extracted from
Lleras-Muney and Shertzer 2015]
6 Year of introduction of birth certificate as official proof of a child's age [extracted from Fagernäs 2014]
Country Introduction of CSL:Preferred Year
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound Sources
Legislation Introducing
Compulsory Schooling Notes
Albania 1928 1928 1928 Hörner et al. (2007), Sefa and Lushnje (2012) Fundamental Statute of the Kingdom ofAlbania (Constitution)
Armenia 1932 1932 1932 Hörner et al. (2007), EFA (2000)
Austria-Hungary 1774 1774 1869
Melton (1988), Slaje (2009), Schneider (1982),
Donnermair (2010), Fort (2006), Ramirez and
Boli (1987), Flora et al. (1983), Cohen (1996)
In Austria, the principle of compulsory education was introduced in 1774 by Joseph II but met with opposition
(Flora et al. (1983), p.555). Six years of compulsory schooling were introduced in 1774 together with state-
controlled public schools (Fort (2006), p.20). Maria Theresa and Joseph II reformed the education the
education system in pursuit of pragmatic goals for the state. In 1781 Joseph II established the principle of
mandatory primary education for all children aged 6-12, although in practice it took decades to realize this in
many crown lands (Cohen (1996), p.15). As attendance was still not satisfactory a century later, the law was re-
iterated with the 1869 Reichsvolksschulgesetz. Complete separation of schools from the Church was achieved
in 1868 (Ramirez and Boli 1987, p.5). In Hungary, compulsory schooling was introduced in 1777 with the "Ratio
Educationis". The 1869 Reichsvolksschulgesetz (the upper bound) applied to all the countries of the Empire
Belgium 1914 1914 1914
Wielemans (1991), Gathmann et al. (2012), Flora
et al. (1983), Colle-Michel (2007), Ramirez and
Boli (1987)
Loi Poullet (Loi du 19 mai 1914) Compulsory education was introduced in 1914 but implemented only after World War I (Flora et al. (1983),p.561)
Britain 1880 1872 1880
Soysal and Strang (1989), Flora et al. (1983),
Ritter (1986), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000),
Anderson (1995)
Compulsory education of eight years was introduced with exceptions in England and Wales in 1880 (Flora et
al. (1983), p.623). School became compulsory in 1881 and free in 1891. However, the legislation was not
implemented in the same way in every community. That is, some communities continued to depend on
voluntary schooling or under the control of religious groups (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.108). In
Scotland, compulsory schooling was already introduced in 1872 (lower bound) with the "Education (Scotland)
Act"
Canada 1871 1871 1943 Oreopoulos (2005)
In the case of Canada, schooling was made compulsory at different points in time in different Canadian states.
The first state to introduce a CSL was Ontario (1871), the last one was Quebec (1943) (Oreopoulos 2005). The
first date (1871) was chosen as the CSL enactment date for Canada
Denmark 1814 1739 1814
Bandle et al. (2005), Gathmann et al. (2012),
Simola (2002), Schneider (1982), Flora et al.
(1983)
Education Act
Compulsory education was first enacted in 1739, but consisted only of religious education and the reading of
certain familiar texts. In 1814, writing was added to the curriculum. Compulsory education covered only three
days a week. Starting from 1869 compulsory education was extended to cover six days a week (Flora et al.
(1983), p.567)
Finland 1921 1921 1921 Hörner et al. (2007), Simola (2002), Flora et al.(1983), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000) Compulsory School Attendance Act
Finland became an independent state in 1917; the primary school institution was established in 1866, but only
became compulsory in 1921 (Simola 2002, p.212) with the introduction of eight years of compulsory schooling
(Flora et al. (1983), p.572). The Parliament passed the law on compulsory education in 1921. The law entitled
everyone to receive education free of charge, regardless of sex, language, or class. […] Towns were given five
years to enforce the law and rural municipalities fifteen. In other words, the elementary schools were not
functioning properly until the late 1930s (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.136)
France 1882 1882 1882
Soysal and Strang (1989), Cubberley (1920),
Schriewer (1985), Schneider (1982), Flora et al.
(1983), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000)
Lois Jules Ferry (Loi n° 11 696 du 28 Mars
1882 (Article 4))
The Jules Ferry Laws established free education (1881) and laic and compulsory education (1882) (Garnier et
al. 1989, p.291)
Germany 1717 1592 1871
Ramirez and Boli (1987), Stolze (1911),
Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), Flora et al.
(1983), Oelkers (2009)
The first German state to introduce compulsory schooling was Palatinate-Zweibrücken in 1592. In Prussia,
compulsory schooling was introduced by Frederick William in 1717, and reiterated by Frederick II in 1763. The
general law of the land (Allgemeines Landrecht) of 1794 makes instruction - as opposed to attendance -
mandatory, a fact that had consequences for school attendance and organization. In this system the state only
regulates the minimum for those parents who cannot provide for their children's attendance. [...]
Elementarschulen became unavoidable but actually only for the poorer classes of the population, who could
not afford a better form of education (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), pp.179-180). Upon unification of the
German Empire in 1871, compulsory schooling (which existed in Prussia) was extended to all states. Eight
years of compulsory education were introduced in the German Empire with the exception of Wurtemberg and
Bavaria where only seven years were introduced (Flora et al. (1983), p.584). Most states already had
compulsory schooling before 1871 (detailed information on all states was not available). As Prussia was the
largest and dominant state at the time of unification, we use the date of its first CSL enactment (1717) as the
reference date for Germany
Greece 1834 1834 1834
Gkolia and Brundrett (2008), Cowen and
Kazamias (2009), Salimova and Dodde (eds.)
(2000)
Bavarian Plan (Decree of 1834)
With the arrival of the Bavarians [i.e., 1833], the formal education in Greece included three levels: the primary,
the secondary, and the higher education. The compulsory schooling was seven years. This educational system
was established by laws relating to the primary schools in 1834 (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.232)
Table A2A: Compulsory Schooling Laws, by Country
Ireland 1892 1892 1898 Schneider (1982), Flora et al. (1983), OBuachalla (1988) Irish Education Act
The 1892 Irish Education Act introduced free primary compulsory schooling (O Buachalla 1988, p.21).
Compulsory education was introduced only in towns in 1892 (with the requirement of minimum attendance of
75 days per year), and extended to rural areas in 1898 (Flora et al. (1983), p.593)
Italy 1877 1859 1877 Cubberley (1920), Schneider (1982), Ramirezand Boli (1987)
In the Kingdom of Sardinia, compulsory education was introduced in 1859 (2 years in all communes, 4 years in
communes over 4,000 population) (Flora et al. (1983), p.598). Upon unification, compulsory school attendance
was extended to all Italian provinces. This process was completed in 1877. The education system was quite
effective in some of the Northern regions by 1880 and in Southern regions by 1900 (Ramirez and Boli 1987,
p.7)
Japan 1872 1872 1872 Duke (2009), Loomis (1962), Burnett and Wada(2007), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000) Gakusei (Fundamental Code of Education)
The Fundamental Code of Education - the Gakusei - was announced in 1872. […] They declared their intention
to spread education and mentioned that educational opportunity should be available for all people […] they
emphasized parents' responsibility for education, every guardian shall bring up his children with tender care,
never failing to have them attend school (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.275)
Luxembourg 1912 1912 1912 Soysal and Strang (1989), UNESCO (2007),European Commission (2010)
Loi du 10 août 1912 sur l'organisation de
l'enseignement primaire
Netherlands 1900 1900 1900
Soysal and Strang (1989), Gathmann et al.
(2012), Schneider (1982), Flora et al. (1986),
Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000)
De Leerplichtwet (July 7, 1900, Staatsblad
No. 111)
Introduction of six years of compulsory education (Flora et al. (1983), p.603). When compulsory education was
introduced in 1900, about 90% of children was already attending a primary school (Salimova and Dodde (eds.)
(2000), p.315)
Norway 1827 1739 1860 Soysal and Strang (1989), Bandle et al. (2005),Hove (1967), Einhorn (2005), Rust (1990) Primary School Act
Poland 1919 1825 1919 Karsten and Majoor (1994), Slaje (2009), Biskup(1983), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000)
Decree On Compulsory Schooling (O
obowiazku skolnym) (February 7, 1919)
In the Prussian part of partitioned Poland, compulsory schooling was introduced in 1825. Shortly after the
reunification, compulsory schooling was extended to the entire country in 1919. School systems inherited from
Russia, Prussia and Austria were different and school traditions varied […] the young country's most important
task in the field of education policy was to adopt a uniform school system (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000),
p.340) […] The Constitution of 1921 failed to provide the rural population with guarantees of any rights to
education of the same quality as that provided to urban areas (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.341)
Portugal 1835 1835 1835 Ministro dos Negocios do Reino (1835) Regulamento Geral Da Instrucção Primaria
Russia 1918 1918 1918
Decree of October 16, 1918, on the
Comprehensive Labor School of the Russian
Socialist Federative Soviet Republic
Decree of October 16, 1918, on the
Comprehensive Labor School of the
Russian Socialist Federative Soviet
Republic
Spain 1857 1857 1857 Gathmann et al. (2012), De Maeyer et al. (2005),Ministerio de Fomento (1857) Ley Moyano de Instrucción Pública de 1857
Sweden 1842 1842 1842 Soysal and Strang (1989), Simola (2002),Schneider (1982) Folkskolestadgan (SFS 1842:19)
The 1842 law was followed in later decades by other bills that made the system entirely universal (Ramirez and
Boli 1987, p.6)
Switzerland 1874 1874 1874 Bundesverfassung (Federal Constitution) Bundesverfassung (Federal Constitution)
Sources contradict each other with respect to introduction of compulsory schooling in different cantons. After
the constitutional change of 1874, age of entry still varied according to cantonal law which also governed the
duration of the primary school course (Flora et al. (1983), p.618). It was the radical new arrangement of society
that made first attempt in 1798, but in a permanent manner only in the 19th century led to the establishment of
the compulsory state school (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.433)
Country Region Year of Introduction ofCompulsory Schooling
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound Sources
Legislation Introducing
Compulsory Schooling Notes
Austria-Hungary Austria 1774 1774 1869
Allgemeine Schulordnung für die
deutschen Normal-, Haupt- und
Trivialschulen in sämmtlichen
Kaiserlich-Königlichen Erbländern
(General School Ordinance)
Hungary 1777 1777 1869 Ratio Educationis
Britain England 1880 1880 1880 Elementary Education Act 1870
Scotland 1872 1872 1872 Education (Scotland) Act
Wales 1880 1880 1880 Elementary Education Act 1870
Germany* Prussia 1717 1717 1763 Schuledikt (Schools Edict,September 28, 1717)
Palatinate-Zweibrücken 1592 1592 1592
German Empire 1871 1871 1871
Italy Kingdom of Sardinia 1859 1859 1859 Legge Casati
Kingdom of Italy 1877 1877 1877 Legge Coppino
Table A2B: Compulsory Schooling Laws, for European Countries With Potential for Within-Country Regional Variation
Notes: ** The data for Germany is not exhaustive as we were unable to locate information for all regions. Only Prussia (the largest state) and Palatinate-Zweibrücken (the earliest state to enact compulsory schooling) are included here.
In Austria, the principle of compulsory education was introduced in 1774 by Joseph II
but met with opposition (Flora et al. (1983), p.555). Six years of compulsory schooling
were introduced in 1774 together with state-controlled public schools (Fort (2006),
p.20). Maria Theresa and Joseph II reformed the education the education system in
pursuit of pragmatic goals for the state. In 1781 Joseph II established the principle of
mandatory primary education for all children aged 6-12, although in practice it took
decades to realize this in many crown lands (Cohen (1996), p.15). As attendance was
still not satisfactory a century later, the law was re-iterated with the 1869
Reichsvolksschulgesetz. Complete separation of schools from the Church was
achieved in 1868 (Ramirez and Boli 1987, p.5). In Hungary, compulsory schooling
was introduced in 1777 with the "Ratio Educationis". The 1869
Reichsvolksschulgesetz (the upper bound) applied to all the countries of the Empire.
Compulsory education of eight years was introduced with exceptions in England and
Wales in 1880 (Flora et al. (1983), p.623). School became compulsory in 1881 and
free in 1891. However, the legislation was not implemented in the same way in every
community. That is, some communities continued to depend on voluntary schooling or
under the control of religious groups (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.108). In
Scotland, compulsory schooling was already introduced in 1872 (lower bound) with
the "Education (Scotland) Act".
The first German state to introduce compulsory schooling was Palatinate-
Zweibrücken in 1592. In Prussia, compulsory schooling was introduced by Frederick
William in 1717, and reiterated by Frederick II in 1763. The general law of the land
(Allgemeines Landrecht) of 1794 makes instruction - as opposed to attendance -
mandatory, a fact that had consequences for school attendance and organization. In
this system the state only regulates the minimum for those parents who cannot
provide for their children's attendance. [...] Elementarschulen became unavoidable
but actually only for the poorer classes of the population, who could not afford a better
form of education (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), pp.179-180). Upon unification
of the German Empire in 1871, compulsory schooling (which existed in Prussia) was
extended to all states. Eight years of compulsory education were introduced in the
German Empire with the exception of Wurtemberg and Bavaria where only seven
years were introduced (Flora et al. (1983), p.584). Most states already had
compulsory schooling before 1871 (detailed information on all states was not
available)
In the Kingdom of Sardinia, compulsory education was introduced in 1859 (2 years in
all communes, 4 years in communes over 4,000 population) (Flora et al. (1983),
p.598). Upon unification, compulsory school attendance was extended to all Italian
provinces. This process was completed in 1877. The education system was quite
effective in some of the Northern regions by 1880 and in Southern regions by 1900
(Ramirez and Boli 1987, p.7)
Cubberley (1920),
Schneider (1982),
Ramirez and Boli (1987)
Ramirez and Boli (1987),
Stolze (1911), Salimova
and Dodde (eds.) (2000),
Flora et al. (1983),
Oelkers (2009)
Soysal and Strang
(1989), Flora et al.
(1983), Ritter (1986),
Salimova and Dodde
(eds.) (2000), Anderson
(1995)
Melton (1988), Slaje
(2009), Schneider (1982),
Donnermair (2010), Fort
(2006), Ramirez and Boli
(1987), Flora et al.
(1983), Cohen (1996)
Table A3: Compulsory Schooling Laws and European Enrolment Rates
Country Sample: Adopted CSLpre-1850
Adopted CSL
post-1850
Enrolment Rate
Reported:
30 years pre-
CSL adoption
30 years post-
CSL adoption Countries Years
Data Source and
Definiton of Enrolment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
62.1₸ 53.1₸ 59.9 74.3
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England and
Wales, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Prussia, Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland
1840-1940
n.a. 53.1₸ 58.2 70.5
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England and
Wales, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Scotland, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland
1846-1941
 Public+private 37.8₸ 40.4 56.5 70.7
Austria, Belgium, England and Wales,
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Scotland
Public 51.2 43.9 52.8 68.8
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Scotland,
Sweden, Switzerland
Not specified n.a. n.a. 35.2 53.3 Denmark, Greece, Japan, Russia, Spain
Primary 14.9 2.20 8.17 11.3
Secondary 0.18 0.05 0.49 0.73
Primary + secondary 14.9 2.24 8.92 12.1
n.a. n.a. 44.5 57.8
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
England and Wales, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Scotland,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
1870-1940
Albania, Austria (Austria-Hungary until
1913), Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany (Prussia until
1866), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, USSR (Russia until
1913), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom.
All Countries
1830-1932
1815-1939
Notes: ₸ indicates those statistics that are calculated from two or fewer country-year observations. No statistics can be calculated in Columns 1 and 2 from the
Benavot and Riddle [1988] data as that starts in 1870. The data from Lindert [2004] (lindert.econ.ucdavis.edu), is based on Flora et al. [1983] and Mitchell [2007]. He
discusses problems with these data and provides alternative estimates based on educational censuses, inspections data and school attendance rates. The exact
measure of enrolment in Lindert’s data differs between countries: for some, he provides public plus private enrollments, for others, only public enrollments; and for
others, the exact measure is unspecified. Comparisons are made between countries for which a common measure is available. Our dataset compiled from Lindert’s
contains 250 observations from 20 countries. Out of these, 84 from 10 countries are used in the public plus private comparison, 111 from 14 countries in the public
comparison, and 30 from 5 countries in the not specified comparison. Mitchell [2007] compiles data from official publications of European governments. He provides
yearly data on the number of pupils in primary and secondary school and the size of certain age groups in the population. Age groups provided are not uniform across
countries, and population data only exists for few years (while enrollment numbers are very complete). The data exhibits a number of breaks, at which enrollment
“jumps” due to changes in measurement or the school system. Our dataset compiled from Mitchell contains 1274 observations from 19 countries (20 after the
partition of Ireland in 1921). Of these, 98 from 17 countries can be used in comparisons as data on the age group 5-14 in the population is available. The data from
Banks and Wilson [2012] is available on the CNTS website (http://www.databanksinternational.com/71.html). They adopt the UNESCO definitions of primary and
secondary schooling: “First level: Education whose main function is to provide basic instruction in the tools of learning (e.g., at elementary school, primary school). Its
length may vary from 4 to 9 years, depending on the organization of the school system in each country; Secondary level: Education based upon at least four years of
previous instruction at the first level, and providing general or specialized instruction, or both (e.g., at middle school, secondary school, high school…)”. They aim to
omit “data on preprimary, vocational or technical, part-time, and adult education students”. Their main data sources are The Statesman’s Yearbook and Zapf and
Flora [1973]. They also use a number of official national government sources and own estimates. Enrolment rates are measured in terms of the entire population. Our
dataset compiled from CNTS et al. contains 2061 observations from 22 countries. Of these, 1522 are used in the primary, 1456 in the secondary, and 1455 in the
primary plus secondary comparison test. Flora et al. [1983] use data from the Western European Data Archive, which contains yearly data on primary and secondary
school enrollment. For primary school enrollment, data on the total number of pupils and on their percentage in the 5-14 age group is provided, both for public plus
private enrollment and for public enrollment only. For secondary school enrollment, the data is more complex, reflecting the diversity of schooling systems across
countries. Variables comprise total enrollments in post-primary schools, lower-secondary schools, general higher secondary schools (public plus private and public
only), all higher secondary schools. For some of these school categories, enrollment is also provided as a percentage of a certain age group. However, the age group
over which it is measured is not consistent across countries. Our dataset compiled from Flora et al. contains 295 observations, of which 135 contained all the
information necessary. Benavot and Riddle [1988] provide primary enrollment rates for age groups 5-14. The data is per decade and spans from 1870 to 1940. It is
compiled from several sources, the main source for Western Europe being Flora et al. [1983]. Our initial dataset compiled from Benavot and Riddle contains 176
observations from 21 countries. In the comparison table, 154 observations are used and no country has to be dropped entirely.
Mitchell [2007]: Primary enrolment rate, 5-14 year
Flora et al. [1983]: Primary enrolment rate, 5-14 year
Lindert [2004]: Primary enrolment rate, 5-14 year olds
Banks and Wilson [2012], CNTS: Number of 5-14
Enrolment in 1850 and
Earlier
Benavot and Riddle [1988]: Primary enrolment rate, 5-14 year olds, by decade
Table A4: Baseline Specification, Enrolment and Illiteracy Coefficients Shown
Non parametric Cox proportional hazard model estimates, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; All covariates measured in effect sizes
Full Specification
Share of the State Population that is:
From European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 2.15***
(.509)
From European Countries that had CSL in 1850 .780
(.161)
Non-European Born 1.80***
(.409)
Enrolment Rate of American-Borns 2.82**
(1.39)
.815*
(.094)
Enrolment Rate in US, of Europeans From Countries that had CSL in 1850 1.03
(.153)
Enrolment Rate in US, of Migrants From Non-European Countries 1.18
(.235)
Illiteracy Rate of Adult American-Borns .155**
(.134)
Illiteracy Rate of Adult Europeans From Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 1.12
(.197)
Illiteracy Rate of Adult Europeans From Countries that had CSL in 1850 .256***
(.088)
Illiteracy Rate of Adult Migrants From Non-European Countries .753
(.186)
Group Controls Yes
State Controls Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value] [.004]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.505]
Observations (state-census year) 230
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard
rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is equal to one. The unit of observation is the state-census
year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is passed. Robust standard errors are
reported. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. All coefficients are
defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The European
countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal
and Sweden. We control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory
schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the enrolment rate in US schools of 8-14 year olds, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that
are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, and the share residing on a farm. We also control for the following state characteristics: the total
population and the average occupational score of the population. At the foot of the Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that
the hazard coefficients are the same for the two European groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the non-
European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have compulsory schooling in place in 1850.
Enrolment Rate in US, of Europeans From Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850
Table A5: Robustness Checks
Non parametric Cox proportional model, hazard rates reported
Robust standard errors; Populations shares measured in effect sizes
(1) Rolling
Window of
Civic Values
(2) Americans
(3) Child Labor and
Birth Registration
Laws in Place
(4) Universal Suffrage
and Women's Property
Rights
(5) European Child
Labor Laws
Share of the State Population that is From:
European Countries that did NOT have CSL introduced in 2.31*
the past 30 years (.995)
European Countries that had CSL introduced sometime in .628*
the past 30 years (.170)
American-Born, Second Generation .777
(.213)
European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 1.62* 2.22*** 2.20*** 2.58***
(.447) (.533) (.528) (.851)
European Countries that had CSL in 1850 1.07 .836 .819 .856
(.244) (.195) (.198) (.161)
Non-European Countries 1.08 1.56** 1.77*** 1.76*** 1.85***
(.262) (.304) (.377) (.386) (.434)
European Countries that had Child Labor Law in 1850 .693
(.317)
Child Labor Laws in Place 1.19 1.19
(.366) (.360)
Birth Registration Law in Place .707 .716
(.283) (.293)
Universal Suffrage for Men and Women .904
(.199)
Women Have Right to Property and their Own Earnings 1.15
(.356)
Group and State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
European Groups Equal (with and without CSL) [p-value] [.049] [.241] [.005] [.004] [.004]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.218] [.894] [.386] [.382] [.316]
Observations (state-census year) 230 230 230 230 230
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the
coefficient is one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling laws are passed. Robust standard errors are reported. The
year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population
shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. From Columns 3 onwards, the European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling
laws in 1850, as well as the one additional group defined in each column): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year
olds and the share residing on a farm. In all Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total population, and the average occupational score of the population. In Column 2 we split the American-born
population into those with and without foreign-born parents. In Column 3, the child labor laws are derived from Moehling [1999, Table 1], and the year of introduction of birth certificate as official proof of a child's age is
extracted from Fagernäs [2014]. In Column 4 the coding for whether the US state has universal suffrage for men is derived from multiple sources, and the state coding for whether women have the right to property and
their own earnings is extracted from Geddes et al. [2012]. In Column 5 the following European countries are defined to have child labor laws in place in 1850: Britain, France, Germany and Switzerland. At the foot of
each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two European groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the non-European
immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have CSL in place in 1850.
Table A6: Alternative Estimation Methods and Alternative Coding of Compulsory Schooling Law in Europe
Robust standard errors; Populations shares measured in effect sizes
Estimation Method: Parametric: Log Logistic OLS
Coefficients Reported: LPM
(1) Log Logistic
Time Ratio
(2) Log Logistic
Time Ratio and
Frailty Parameter
(3) OLS (4) Lower BoundDefinition of CSL
(5) Upper Bound
Definition of CSL
Share of the State Population that is From:
European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850 .940*** .944** .019 1.59** 1.20
(.020) (.021) (.036) (.343) (.257)
European Countries that had CSL in 1850 1.02 1.01 .017 .821 .759***
(.026) (.015) (.042) (.151) (.076)
Non-European Born Country .953*** .970* .050* 2.08*** 1.73**
(.017) (.016) (.030) (.478) (.433)
State and Group Controls Yes Yes Yes + Stateand Year FE Yes Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value] [.012] [.006] [.967] [.004] [.005]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value] [.520] [.078] [.543] [.332] [.251]
Gamma Parameter .025*** .016***
(.004) (.005)
Theta Parameter .324
(.270)
Observations (state-census year) 230 230 371 230 230
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. In Columns 1 to 5 a non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. robust standard errors are
reported. In Columns 1 and 2 a parametric hazard model is estimated, where the baseline hazard is assumed to follow a log logistic distribution: the time to failure is then reported, and in Column 2 we also
allow for a frailty parameter to be estimated. At the foot of Columns 1 and 2 the relevant parameters from the parametric hazard and frailty parameters are reported. In all Columns except 3 tests for coefficient
significance relate to the null that the coefficient is one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling laws are
passed. In Column 3 an OLS panel data model is estimated (controlling for state and year fixed effects) where the dependent variable is equal to one if compulsory schooling laws are in place. The year of
passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population
shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark,
Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling
laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds and the share residing on a farm. In all
Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total population, and the average occupational score of the population.
Time Ratio
Non Parametric: Cox Proportional
Hazard Rate
Table A7: First Stage Estimates for 2SRI Instrumental Variables Method
OLS and Nonparametric First Stage Estimates
Standard errors clustered by state in Columns 1 to 3
(1) From European
Countries that did NOT
have CSL in 1850
(2) From European
Countries that had
CSL in 1850
(3) Non-
European Born
(4) From European
Countries that did NOT
have CSL in 1850
(5) From European
Countries that had
CSL in 1850
(6) Non-
European Born
Bartik-Card Instrument .807*** .898*** .687*** .484*** .708*** .564***
(.050) (.072) (.151) (.057) (.078) (.160)
Group Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
State Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations (state-census year) 180 180 180 180 180 180
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. In Columns 1 to 3 an OLS regression model is used. In Columns 3 to 6 a local linear regression is estimated with Epanechnikov Kernel weights and
(constant) optimal cross-validated bandwidth selection based on the leave-one-out Kernel. The outcome variable is the share of state s's population from each migrant group (measured as an effect size). The unit
of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1860 (the first census year in 1850 is dropped because the Bartik-Card Instrument cannot be constructed for that first period). Standard errors are
clustered by state in the OLS specifications in Columns 1 to 3. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway,
Portugal and Sweden. In Column 4 onwards we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged
0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds, the labor force participation rate, and the share residing on a farm. We also control for the following state
characteristics: the total population and the average occupational score of the population.
Share of the State Population that is:
Table A8: Population and the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws by US State
OLS estimates, standard errors clustered by region
(1) Unconditional (2) FixedEffects
(3) Mean
Reversion
(4) Foreign
Born
Population
(5) European
Born from
Countries that
had CSL in 1850
(6) European Born
from Countries that
did NOT have CSL
in 1850
(7) Ratio of Europeans
from Countries without
CSL in 1850 to Those that
had CSL in 1850
A. Mean Reversion Model
CSL Passed [yes=1] 1.04*** -.112* -.074 .113 .098 .063 -2.96
(.174) (.056) (.062) (.078) (.106) (.103) (2.43)
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Year x 1850 Population Interactions No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Year x 1850 Occ Score Interactions No No No No No No No
Observations (state-census year) 288 288 288 288 286 288 286
B. Trend Break Model
Post CSL Passage Trend Break -.003 -.013* - -.001 .008 .001 -.251
(.009) (.016) - (.005) (.005) (.004) (.216)
1850-1930 Trend .025*** .030*** - .020*** .017*** .018*** -.032
(.004) (.004) - (.005) (.003) (.003) (.040)
-
State Fixed Effects No Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (state-census year) 288 288 - 288 286 288 286
Log (State Population) Foreign Born Population
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is a state-census year from 1850 to 1930. The dependent variable varies across columns: in Columns 1 to 3 it is the log of the total
state population, and in Columns 4 to 7 it relates to various migrant populations. All variables are derived from the IPUMS-USA census samples. OLS regression estimates are shown with standard errors clustered by
census region. In Panel A, a mean reversion model is estimated (allowing for state and year effects, as well as a linear time effect of the outcome in 1850) and in Panel B a trend break model is estimated (including state
fixed effects and a linear time trend). The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden.
Notes: All variables are derived from the 100% IPUMS-USA 1880 census sample. In Figure D, there are some states in which none of the foreign-born population resides in urban areas. The solid line shows the mean of
each variable in all state-census years prior to the adoption of compulsory schooling laws. The dashed line shows the .5 population share.
Figure A1: Foreign Population by US State, 1880
A. Share of Total Population that is Foreign Born B. Share of Male Population that is Foreign Born
D. Share of Urban Population that is Foreign BornC. Share of Labor Force that is Foreign Born
0 .2 .4 .6
North CarolinaVirginia
GeorgiaSouth Carolina
AlabamaMississippi
TennesseeArkansas
KansasKentucky
VermontMaryland
DelawareLouisiana
IndianaWest Virginia
FloridaTexas
MaineColorado
IowaPennsylvania
OhioConnecticut
MissouriNew Jersey
Rhode IslandNebraska
OregonMichigan
New HampshireMassachusetts
IllinoisNew York
MinnesotaWisconsin
CaliforniaUtah
NevadaArizona
North DakotaSouth Dakota
IdahoMontana
New MexicoWyoming
Washington
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
North CarolinaGeorgia
South CarolinaVirginia
AlabamaMississippi
TennesseeArkansas
FloridaWest Virginia
KentuckyLouisiana
TexasMaine
IndianaMaryland
DelawareNew Mexico
VermontMissouri
KansasNew Hampshire
OhioPennsylvania
ColoradoIowa
ConnecticutNew Jersey
IllinoisOregon
NebraskaRhode Island
MassachusettsMichigan
New YorkWashington
WyomingSouth Dakota
IdahoMontana
WisconsinNorth Dakota
ArizonaUtah
MinnesotaCalifornia
Nevada
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
North CarolinaGeorgia
South CarolinaVirginia
MississippiAlabama
TennesseeArkansas
West VirginiaKentucky
FloridaLouisiana
TexasIndiana
DelawareMaryland
MaineNew Mexico
MissouriKansas
VermontNew Hampshire
OhioPennsylvania
IowaColorado
New JerseyIllinois
ConnecticutOregon
New YorkMassachusetts
NebraskaMichigan
Rhode IslandWashington
WyomingUtah
South DakotaWisconsin
IdahoMontana
MinnesotaCalifornia
ArizonaNorth Dakota
Nevada
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
North CarolinaGeorgia
South CarolinaVirginia
MississippiAlabama
TennesseeArkansas
West VirginiaFlorida
KentuckyLouisiana
TexasIndiana
New MexicoDelaware
MarylandMissouri
MaineKansas
VermontOhio
New HampshirePennsylvania
IowaOregon
ColoradoIllinois
New JerseyWashington
ConnecticutMichigan
New YorkNebraska
MassachusettsRhode Island
WyomingIdaho
WisconsinSouth Dakota
MontanaUtah
CaliforniaMinnesota
NevadaArizona
North Dakota
Mean in all state-years
pre-CSL adoption
Mean in all state-years
pre-CSL adoption
Mean in all state-years
pre-CSL adoption
Mean in all state-years
pre-CSL adoption
Notes: Each graph shows a scatter plot, by state, of the population share of various migrant groups against the share of American-borns resident in the state that were born outside of the state (and in another US state). The data on American-born internal migration is obtained
from the 1880 census. On each scatter plot we superimpose the line of best fit and a confidence interval of the prediction.
Figure A3: Internal Migration by American-Borns and Migrant Groups
Figure A2: Migrant Groups Population Shares, Averaged Across pre-Compulsory Schooling Census Years
European Born from Countries that did NOT have CSL in
Place in 1850
European Born from Countries that had CSL in Place in
1850 Non-European Born
Notes: The bars represents the mean population share of immigrants by group for each US state prior to the passage of compulsory schooling laws in the state. The year of passage of compulsory school
attendance laws are extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
Norway, Portugal and Sweden.
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Figure A4: Foreign Population by US County, 1880
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